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Abstract 
 
South Africa’s industrial policy is fundamentally aimed at transforming the domestic 
economy into a labour-intensive growth path in order to create jobs (the dti, 2013a, p. 
10). In pursuit of this aim the industrial policy takes a transversal approach to promote 
particular types of economic activity or particular economic sectors (the dti, 2013a, pp. 
15-17; Zalk, 2014, p. 335). Using the case of the automotive sector, this study analyses 
the role played by the state and how institutional aspects of the industrial policy and 
investment promotion affected policymaking and the outcomes.  
  
The findings were that, due to incoherent institutional support and informational 
asymmetry, industrial policy has supported export growth in spite of the continued 
dependence on imports; and did not support employment, because it was biased 
towards OEMs and did not differentiate between the different categories of 
components according to job-creation potential. Institutional aspects of industrial 
policy-making and implementation then – not the ownership power of multinational 
corporations – has entrenched unequal power relations within the automotive value-
chain, which undermines the broader socio-economic goals of industrial policy. Hence, 
due to both the policy measures and the institutional design South Africa’s industrial 
policy has not been oriented towards more labour-absorbing activities, especially in 
the impact on local components manufacturing.  
 
The result has been growth in exports with limited integration of local producers into 
the global value-chains of multinational OEMs, except in the case of vertically 
integrated multinational component producers, at the expense of local value-addition 
and job-creation. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
Introduction 
South Africa’s automotive sector was established in the 1920s and, with concerted 
state support, the industry has grown and developed extensively over the last 94 years. 
In the discourse on industrial development and industrial policy, the automotive sector 
is seen as being attractive because its growth has a strong positive multiplier effect, or 
spillover effect, due the sector’s backward and forward linkages. An often-cited 
example is that of the leather and hides industry which benefits from growth in the 
automotive sector as a result of its linkages through demand for leather and trim 
products used in motor vehicle interiors (Duncan, 1992a, p. 68; Black & Roberts, 2009, 
p. 221; Barnes & Black, 2013, p. 10). Other sectors that benefit from growth in 
automotives include logistics, finance, retail and marketing etc. (AIEC, 2013, p. 19). The 
automotive sector is therefore a strong candidate or target of industrial policy because 
its growth also generates growth to upstream and downstream industries linked to 
automotive value-chain.   
 
South African industrial policy consists of various transversal and sector-specific 
policies and interventions as part of the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). Transversal 
policies offer support across sectors or for a particular aspect of manufacturing. This 
includes incentives such as tax deductions and rebates to encourage: plant and 
machinery upgrades (e.g. 12i tax incentive), research and development expenditure 
(e.g. 11d tax incentive), energy efficiency (e.g. S12L tax incentive), and exports (e.g. 
import rebate credit certificates and duty credit certificates) (the dti, 2013a, pp. 26-27). 
Firms can also apply for subsidies on capital equipment upgrade through the 
Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme (the dti, 2013a, pp. 41-43). 
There are also sector specific interventions that are part of the Automotive Production 
Development Plan (APDP), which was preceded by the Motor Industry Development 
Plan (MIDP), including tariff protection under the special provisions of Chapter 98 in 
the Customs and Tariff Schedule, capital equipment and production subsidies such as 
the Automotive Investment Scheme and the Production Incentive (the dti, 2010, p. 55; 
the dti, 2013b, p. 39). 
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State support to industry and business is substantial and takes different forms beyond 
the abovementioned. It is difficult to calculate the total on- and off-budget support to 
industries, but the average annual on-budget incentives to business between 
FY2012/13 and FY2014/15 amounted to R5.42 billion per year and projected to be 
R6.08 billion between FY2015/16 and FY2017/18 (National Treasury, 2015a, pp. 597-
601). And the latest available data on off-budget incentives such as foregone revenue 
from tax incentives and duty rebates amounted to R24 billion in FY2012/13 (National 
Treasury, 2015b, p. 134). But this excludes state support such as preferential 
procurement, sector support centres such as the Automotive Industry Development 
Centre and the Durban Automotive Cluster, and other support programmes. In light 
of the substantial estimated costs above and the further unknown costs associated 
with the quantum of state support, there is a need to evaluate the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the incentives in order to make recommendations for improvements 
where possible.  
 
Through IPAP the state aims to transform the South African economy and set it on a 
more job-intensive growth path by supporting labour-intensive and higher value-
added industries in order to reduce unemployment, poverty and inequality. Therefore, 
despite IPAP consisting of a broad range of interventions such as trade tariffs 
interventions, competition and regulatory policy, government subsidies and technical 
partnerships – the central focus is on job-creation (the dti, 2013a, p. 10). This creates a 
key criterion to evaluate effectiveness of industrial policy. Growth in output, investment 
and exports are other criteria to measure effectiveness of industrial policy as these are 
signs of improved productivity in local production and a source for foreign reserves 
and economic growth. However, growth should not be achieved at the expense of job-
creation in order to achieve the central aim of South Africa’s industrial policy. 
 
Preliminary Assessment of the Automotive Sector Performance 
The automotive sector output has grown considerably. Most notably, from about 1998, 
the automotive subsector’s level of output grew significantly above the aggregate of 
the total manufacturing sector level of production (Figure 1 below). Despite the more 
than 200% increase in production, employment levels declined by a nett 25% since 
1995 (Figure 1 below). This undermines the foregone introduction of the automotive 
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sector’s contribution to job-creation and suggests that the automotive sector has been 
restructured toward more capital-intensive production.  
 
Figure 1: Automotive Sector Trends (1980-2013) 
 
(Author’s Calculations & Depiction, Data Source: Quantec) 
 
Investment as a share of domestic value added has grown modestly and slowly 
recovered from the 2007/08 slump. Nevertheless, investment as a percentage of 
domestic value added has declined by about 10% since 2004 (Figure 1 above). Other 
research has found that South African automotive firms have invested less than 6% of 
their sales revenues on average in the last decade (Barnes & Black, 2013, p. 24). This 
suggests that automotive firms’ profits are being invested at a slower rate or, even 
worse, that when investment occurs it is in low value-added production. And even 
though slowing investment is a global trend, South Africa is in a worse position given 
its lower starting base.  
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Imports remained below 40% of domestic demand until 2005, even after the general 
trade tariff liberalisation from 1995 onwards (Figure 1 above). However, imports 
increased above 40% of domestic demand thereafter. Export growth has been highly 
correlated with growth in imports over the study period (91% correlation). Therefore 
the sector has had a persistent trade deficit because imports have grown along with 
increases in exports. This suggests that there has been limited, possibly declining, 
localisation hence the reduction in jobs despite considerable growth in output and 
exports. Imports penetration has therefore subverted the central aim of the state’s 
industrial policy. 
 
Thus, there are three discernible trends in the automotive sector over the study period. 
Firstly, employment has deteriorated over the study period despite considerable 
increases in output and exports, which suggests a restructuring of the sector towards 
more capital intensive production since the early 1990s. Secondly, despite 
outperforming the manufacturing production since 1998, the automotive sector has 
seen declining investment in recent years.  Lastly, exports have increased but this has 
been met by an increased import penetration which suggests that localisation is a 
persistent challenge in the sector.  
 
Problem Statement 
In order to increase localisation, the state needs to promote investment and local 
sourcing of automotive components by motor vehicle manufacturers. This cannot be 
achieved through policy alone, and in fact depends on institutional aspects of 
investment promotion and the policy environment which together determine the 
political economy of industrial policy (Burke & Epstein, 2001, p. 3).  
 
Institutional aspect of investment promotion arise from the formal and informal rules 
that govern the behaviour and decision-making of the relevant stakeholders such as 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), component producers, labour and the state 
itself through government departments and agencies involved in the development of 
the automotive sector. These institutional aspects form the institutional context which 
sets constraints on the shape and implementation of policy. Whilst on the other hand 
the policy environment, which consists of the formal contents of policy and enacted 
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laws, acts as a constraint that is set periodically or changed over time. Together these 
two elements interact to determine the political economy of industrial policy. 
 
For example, firms may use the threat of divestment to bargain for greater state 
incentives or try to influence state officials who are constrained by fiscal norms such 
as the multi-year budgeting process under the Medium-term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) and the Medium-term Strategic Framework (MTSF). Despite being constrained 
by the MTEF and MTSF processes state officials may find ways to finance greater 
incentives through the annual planning process, reallocation of resources or using off-
budget resources. Ultimately the state officials have a choice to make with respect to 
whether or not, and when, they may want to implement changes taking into account 
firms’ lobbying. This is where the institutional aspects of investment promotion and 
the policy environment come into play resulting in the political economy of industrial 
policy and economic outcomes. Similarly, institutional aspects such as formal and 
informal rules on professional conduct and culture determine the investment patterns 
and performance of automotive firms (Duncan, 1992b). Therefore it is imperative to 
understand the state’s engagement with automotive firms and how institutional 
factors of investment promotion and the policy environment affect policy-making and 
the outcomes.  
 
However, a large part of the literature on the role of the state and the industrial policy 
in the automotive sector has been predominantly concerned with the formal contents 
of state policy and addressing shortcomings through policy-related recommendations, 
some of which were part of state-funded reviews of the industrial policy in 2006 (see 
Black, 2001; Flatters, 2005; Rustomjee & Hanival, 2008; Black & Roberts, 2009;  
Lamprecht, Rudansky-Klopper, & Strydom, 2011; Barnes & Black, 2013). Many previous 
studies overlook the institutional aspects which also contribute to the political 
economy of industrial policy. This is tantamount to implicitly assuming that policy 
alone or the political will to address shortcomings in policy will ultimately result in the 
desired outcomes. 
 
The problem is not about the dichotomy between policy and the institutional aspects 
of development per se. Nor is it about the relationship between policy analysis and 
institutional analysis. Rather the problem, and focus of this study, is about policy-
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making and implementation instead of an analysis of the formal contents of policy. 
Hence, in order to do this and contribute towards resolving the identified problem, 
this study undertakes an institutional analysis of the political economy of industrial 
policy as defined above.   
 
The Research Question 
Given that the critical challenge has been identified as inducing investment in stronger 
local production capabilities, this study is concerned with critically analysing the role 
played by the state in the development of the industry from 1994 until 2014. Therefore 
the study is primarily focused at responding to: how institutional aspects of the 
industrial policy and investment promotion affected policymaking and the outcomes; 
and what the role of the state has been in promoting investments that increase local 
content in the production of motor vehicles? 
 
To answer these central questions the study focuses on institutions resulting from the 
social structures, social relations, power relations, and incentives which influence the 
formation and implementation of industrial policy and investment promotion; and the 
broader policy environment and its relation to the institutional context.  
 
What follows is a discussion of the relevant literature and the methodology used to 
respond to the research question. This is followed by a presentation of the findings, a 
discussion of the policy implication and concluding remarks.  
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Chapter Two: Background and Literature Review 
Background 
Prior to the MIDP the state implemented a Local Content Programme (LCP) which was 
a set of local content requirements and high tariffs protection aimed at domestic 
producers in order to create jobs and reduce the automotive sector’s dependence on 
imported parts (Barnes, 2013, p. 2).  The South African state’s justification for 
intervening in the manufacturing sector was to create jobs for the mass white unskilled 
and semi-skilled labour that had become a socioeconomic concern for the state based 
on evidence provided by the Board of Trade and Industries (BTI) in 1939 (Kooy & 
Robertson, 1966, p. 214). 
 
The problem of white unemployment was partly caused by state involvement in mining 
and agriculture to establish a system of migrant labour which guaranteed cheap black 
labour for mining and led to extensive use of cheap coloured labour in agriculture 
(Kooy & Robertson, 1966, p. 214). The interest of white labour was reinforced through 
the use of a minimum protection tariff that was applied if the industry maintained 
“unsatisfactory labour conditions” - which meant more than just an unliveable wage 
and poor working conditions (Kooy & Robertson, 1966, p. 214). And most of the state 
support given to OEMs was on the mutual understanding that they would create jobs 
for white labour. In later years this narrow justification for the state intervention in the 
automotive sector was expanded with the growing concerns about the persistent trade 
deficit in the sector and its impact on foreign reserves. 
 
The LCP was successful at creating jobs for white labour primarily. Even though in the 
latter stages of the LCP there was more extensive utilisation of coloured and black 
labour, the managerial and supervisory positions were still reserved for whites 
(Duncan, 1992b, p. 2). Employment had grown from about 9500 people in 1961 when 
LCP Phase I was implemented to 120 000 by 1982 during LCP Phase V (Dix, 1995, p. 
29). However, the LCP did not succeed in reversing the trade deficit. As a result, by 
1977 the BTI research’s found that previous phases of the LCP had a limited impact on 
reducing the trade deficit and the BTI recommended increasing the minimum local 
content requirement to 66% during Phase IV of the LCP.  However, unlike previous 
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phases of the LCP, the state did not define a time-frame for compliance with this local 
content requirement (Dix, 1995, p. 28; Barnes, 2013, p. 5).  
 
The increased local content requirement was meant to serve a triple purpose. Firstly, 
the increased local content would lead to more job-creation for whites. Because, as 
OEMs increased their local content thereby increasing demand for some local 
components they would encourage more investment in local automotive components 
production. Secondly it was meant to reduce the trade deficit by encouraging 
localisation of components instead of importation. Thirdly, the increased local content 
was meant to lead to rationalisation as few OEMs would meet the requirements and 
some would exit thereby increasing the scale of production and efficiency of local 
production (Dix, 1995, p. 26). However these last two aims did not occur as envisaged. 
 
Dealing with Capital Constraints and the Challenges of ISI 
In the late 1980s the state became aware of two negative impacts of the LCP. Firstly, 
the LCP led to market distortion because more OEMs sought to meet their local 
content requirements through local sourcing of heavy components as local content 
was measured by weight (Barnes, 2013, p. 5). This had the negative impact of 
incentivising investment in local production of heavy motor vehicle components which 
had little local value-added. Secondly, since OEMs were able to meet their local 
content requirement by sourcing heavy components locally, they increasingly met 
their demand for other light and higher-value-added components through 
importation which had a negative impact on foreign exchange and the balance of 
payments (Dix, 1995, pp. 34-36). Therefore, because of this, the LCP was unsuccessful 
in reducing the trade deficit and saving on foreign exchange. Moreover, it was realised 
that the LCP had placed high costs on local OEMs, most of which went to capital and 
equipment imports, which pushed up the cost of vehicles and deepened the trade 
deficit.  
 
The state responded by changing the measure of local content from being weight-
based to value-based as prompted by these last two outcomes. In addition to the 
measurement changes, the state allowed for exports to count as local content and 
increased the average import duty, and hence the level of protection, for automotive 
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components (Lamprecht, et al., 2011, p. 66). These were major changes in the state’s 
position and industrial policy more generally which set the conditions for import-
export complementation during the final stages of the LCP. Thus the state had gone 
from the understanding that the state directed development of the sector, to the state 
supporting the development of the sector. This was also partially due to the 
challenging and uncertain political and economic conditions caused by economic 
sanctions against South Africa and rising political violence against Apartheid in the 
mid-1980s, which led to a deterioration of the state’s bargaining power. 
  
Figure 2: Financial and Economic Indicators (1977-1994) 
 
(Author’s Depiction, Data Source: Quantec)  
 
South Africa faced sanctions and major divestment in the mid- to late-1980s. This dried 
the country’s access to foreign finance meaning the pressure on foreign reserves was 
even more challenging. And this meant that exports needed to be promoted more 
concertedly in order to finance the net capital outflows during this period. To some 
degree the promotion of exports was achieved as the state ran a current account 
surplus due to capital outflow from mid-1984 to 1994 (Figure 2 above). However, 
despite the wave of divestment by some local OEMs, there was no significant change, 
and later matters worsened, in terms of the proliferation of models. In 1960 there were 
16 local OEMs were producing 24 models and by 1987 the remaining seven OEMs 
produced 20 models, which increased to 34 models by 1993 (Dix, 1995, p. 26; Pitot, 
2010; Barnes, 2013, p. 7). 
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There are two reasons why the LCPs did not lead to rationalisation as had been 
intended. Firstly, every time manufacturers experienced negative market conditions 
they appealed for state support which was readily afforded (Dix, 1995, p. 33). This is 
not surprising given that researching the duration for needed state support and the 
point at which supported industries would be self-sufficient were not part of the BTI’s 
mandate (Kooy & Robertson, 1966, p. 212). In addition, the LCPs undermined 
rationalisation because the LCP requirements disincentivised market exit. The capital 
equipment required by Phase V was so high that firms could not exit the market due 
to sunk costs and because they were overly invested (Dix, 1995, p. 34). Therefore, firms 
responded by increasing their investment in line with local content requirements of 
Phase V and VI. For example, the ratio of fixed to working capital increase from 20:80 
in 1960 to about 37:63 in 1988 (Duncan, 1992a, pp. 63-64).  
 
In addition to this, during the late 1980s and early 1990s OEMs introduced new models 
with progressively lower local content (Duncan, 1992a, p. 75) because a rebate facility 
established in Phase III of the LCP allowed lower local content on new models for a 
few years after their introduction. And OEMs focused on bolstering their interest 
position in the sector by investing in both internal capacity and vertical integration of 
some component production capacities. According to Duncan (1992a, p. 75) the firms 
responded in this way as a contingency to prepare for both export-orientated or 
import-substitution growth policies by the state because the political situation and 
policy stance was increasingly uncertain during this period. This move by OEMs was 
also in line with some of the developments in the global economy and the 
restructuring of local OEM production from national towards international 
arrangements which increased foreign ownership in the South African automotive 
sector.  
 
South Africa’s Reintegration into the Global Economy 
By the time the MIDP was introduced the state had changed its approach to industrial 
policy dramatically. Historically the state would have responded by penalising non-
compliance with local content requirements and reducing that firm’s import rebate 
value; and by reducing tariff protection afforded to an industry in the case of 
“unsatisfactory labour conditions” (Kooy & Robertson, 1966, p. 214; Barnes, 2013, p. 
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3). However, by Phase VI of the LCP the state had an incentivising rather than punitive 
approach to its industrial policy.  
 
The democratic era introduced various political and economic changes including the 
end of Apartheid and lifting of economic sanctions against South Africa. In 1995, South 
Africa signed the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) with strong 
commitments to reduce trade tariffs and the implementation of general trade 
liberalisation. In terms of industrial strategies, South Africa has followed the Australian 
“Button Plan” at the time of signing the GATT. This meant that the set of protective 
tariffs would progressively reduce to zero. Moreover, the industrial strategy went from 
focusing on demand-side interventions in the form of high tariffs to protect the 
domestic industry and disincentivise imports, to a system of supply-side interventions 
to promote exports and integrate the local industry into the global economy. 
 
Under the MIDP the local content requirements were abolished, the tariff rate was 
progressively reduced, the state increased its support by offering finance through the 
Automotive Investment Scheme (AIS) and established a system of import-export 
complementation which allowed firms to claim import duty credits based on the value 
of their exports (Barnes & Black, 2013, pp. 3-4). The MIDP was also aimed at integrating 
the local automotive sector into the global economy following years of isolation due 
to sanctions under Apartheid.  
 
The APDP picks up where the MIDP left off and is aimed at promoting rationalisation 
and localisation through similar policy tools as the MIDP. Due to budget-constraints, 
the state was forced to reduce its system of duty rebates to equal its regime of import 
duty protections (Lamprecht, et al., 2011, p. 66). This had a strong appeal since it 
reduced the cost of industrial policy and industrial development for the state in a 
context when public debt was rising (see Figure 2 above). The state continued using a 
system of duty rebates which offsets excise duties with customs duties under the MIDP 
and APDP. Thus, although there is continuity within the state, the state changed 
fundamentally from its previously racially-biased and state-directed import-
substituting industrialisation strategy (supported through a protectionist tariff regime) 
to an export-orientated development strategy supported by a liberalised tariff regime. 
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Gap in the Literature 
There has been limited analysis of how institutions in the South African automotive 
sector affect industrial policy and its outcomes, except in cases which involve the 
restructuring of labour demand as a result of policy changes (see Black, 2001; 
Masondo, 2003). And where there has been an explicit institutional analysis, the studies 
have been exclusively about the pre-MIDP period and mainly focused on corporate 
culture in relation to investment decision-making and management styles; instead of 
relating the institutions to industrial policy (see Duncan, 1992a; Duncan, 1992b). Other 
institutional analysis has been limited to structural and global value-chains (GVCs) 
analyses of transformation in the sector and automotive firms' sourcing decision as a 
way of explaining why industrial policy has been ineffective in increasing local content 
(see Barnes & Kaplinsky, 2000; Barnes & Morris, 2008; Barnes, 2013). Some studies 
have focused on a structural analysis of policy and recommend rationalising industrial 
policy as a means to overcome industrial policy coherence which has been cited as the 
primary challenge facing the state (Flatters, 2005, p. 17; Rustomjee & Hanival, 2008, p. 
84). 
 
Although some of these studies have considered the institutional aspects of industrial 
policy, the studies have not adequately interrogated the institutional aspects of the 
political economy of industrial policy. The emphasis has been on how institutions 
(primarily those related to OEMs) have undermined industrial policy due to the way in 
which incentives have been incoherently designed. The literature does not link 
institutions to actual policy-making nor has there been adequate analysis of how state 
institutions impact on industrial policy or how corporate strategy affects state 
institutions. 
 
Elsewhere the literature is focused on comparative analysis of the policy choices and 
explains the choice of industrial policy focus in South Africa, which has been on supply-
side inducement with little demand-side interventions since our trade liberalisation in 
1995 (see Barnes & Black, 2011). By and large, the discourse is focused on the 
economic outcomes as a way of assessing shortcomings within the formal contents of 
policy and making policy-related recommendations, some of which were part of state-
funded reviews of the industrial policy in 2006 (see Flatters, 2005; Rustomjee & Hanival, 
2008; Black & Roberts, 2009; Barnes & Black, 2013). Nevertheless, this body of work 
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highlights three salient issues which point towards institutional aspects and 
coordination challenges as central factors that have hindered the development of the 
South African automotive sector. 
  
Firstly there is the issue of the low-volume production of different vehicle models 
across all makes which has kept automotive production in a spiral of low-volumes 
and high unit costs; undermining specialisation and thus hindering the 
competitiveness of local production (Black, 2001, pp. 3, 6-7; Barnes & Black, 2011, p. 4; 
Lamprecht, et al., 2011, p. 68). Therefore, the choice of vehicle manufacturers (referred 
to as OEMs) to produce many different makes and models locally has locked local 
automotive production in a spiral of low volumes and high unit costs of production. 
The sector has not been able to reduce the unit costs of production through 
economies of scale associated with higher output volumes which also has an impact 
in terms of specialisation and competitiveness of local component producers. 
Moreover, this has hindered investment in the local components production and also 
increased competition from imports. 
 
Secondly there is the issue of the policy coherence. The choice to liberalise the 
automotive industry by reducing the tariff protection has encouraged the global 
integration of the local industry, but also reduced the profits of the automotive firms 
due to limited domestic demand in the context of an internationally uncompetitive 
industry (Barnes & Black, 2013, p. 3). Moreover, given that South African component 
producers operate at inefficient scales of production, trade liberalisation has increased 
pressure from imports and possibly further entrenches the import-dependency of the 
sector (Barnes & Morris, 2008, pp. 8-9). Unlike the theoretical analysis that trade 
liberalisation leads to improved competitiveness of a local industry,  the results of the 
trade liberalisation depend on the strategies of the multinational firms, the domestic 
market conditions and policy environment (Barnes & Black, 2013, p. 3).  
 
So there are two issues here, firstly that trade liberalisation after 1994 was premature 
given the global competitiveness of the local industry. Secondly, that although the 
trade liberalisation has helped integrate the local industry into the global economy, 
the ease at which policy allowed for duty neutrality undermined the incentive to source 
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components locally thus further hindering development of the local automotive sector 
(Barnes & Black, 2011, p. 5; Barnes & Black, 2013, p. 34). 
 
Thirdly, there is the issue of OEMs that had a preference for importing components 
or sourcing from multinational subsidiaries as opposed to investing in local 
component production (Barnes & Kaplinsky, 2000, pp. 802-804; Black, 2001, p. 11; 
Barnes & Black, 2011, p. 5). As highlighted above, because of the ease at which firms 
could achieve duty neutrality, the literature points to the fact that the MIDP import-
export complementation (gaining duty credits for exports in order to finance imports) 
made importing components “easier than increasing local content in low volume 
locally assembled vehicles” for OEMs (Black, 2001, p. 11).  
 
However it is unclear whether it was the incoherencies of the MIDP policy or the 
inefficient scales of production that led firms to import components as opposed to 
investing in local production. Nevertheless, these both reinforce the low investment 
in local components production. Therefore the sector continues to have a trade deficit 
despite considerable increases in the exports because OEMs have decided to meet 
their increased component demands through imports as opposed to local sourcing of 
components under the export-import complementation of the MIDP (Barnes & Black, 
2013, p. 11). 
 
The abovementioned developments and economic outcomes have been inimical to 
industrial development and the main objective of state intervention and industrial 
policy – which is to promote economic growth and create jobs. This means the nature 
of the exports and imports really matters; especially the extent to which more labour 
intensive components were being imported rather than being incorporated into local 
production. Thus it is imperative to examine the nature of the exports and the reasons 
behind low investment. 
 
The foregone overview of the body of literature highlights the importance of 
institutional aspects and coordination challenges which have hindered the 
development of the South African automotive sector. This study argues that general 
shortcomings and failures to attain desired outcomes can be caused by incoherent 
policy design and, or, institutional factors in policy-making and implementation such 
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as poor state capacity or inimical corporate strategy. Economic outcomes also depend 
on the institutional aspects guiding the decisions of the relevant stakeholder which are 
constrained by the policy environment. In other words, one can study various iterations 
of the industrial policy and assess the outcomes by conjecturing on how the state 
influenced firms’ decision-making through the formal contents of policy and the 
impact of affected policy changes. But a richer analysis would involve unpacking how 
and why the policy changes happened in the first place. 
 
Therefore there is an epistemological gap because the strong focus on the contents of 
policy in the literature ignores the impact of the relevant institutions on the economic 
outcomes thereby implicitly assuming that policy alone or political-will determines 
outcomes of industrial policy. Thus it is important to analyse the institutional aspects 
of the political economy of industrial policy-making and implementation in order to 
understanding and resolve some of the problems faced; and propose tenable 
recommendations. This is what this study aims to offer. 
 
Throughout the foregone discussion there is a clear, and sometimes implicit, 
understanding that the state has had an important role in the development of the 
automotive sector – and industrial development more generally. This is true despite 
the sometimes inimical outcomes that have resulted from the relation between 
industrial policy and corporate strategy. To further situate this research the study 
begins with a broader overview of the literature on the role of the state in economic 
development before analysing the literature on the relationship between industrial 
policy and corporate strategy. 
 
Literature Review 
For more than half a century, the focus of development economics has been on how 
the state can assist or direct economic growth. Although most economists see this as 
the central aim of the state, different economic schools emphasise different 
contributing factors and have maintained influence over different periods and 
geographic regions. Changes in the global economic environment have also affected 
the development of the discourse on the role of the state in development. The 
globalisation of capitalism and the rising dominance of firms influenced a shift in the 
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focus of the discourse from state-centred approaches to more firm-centred 
approaches. Nevertheless, the result of these changes have highlighted the 
importance of institutions and coordinating industrial policy with corporate strategy 
as the main determinants of economic outcomes. 
 
Mainstream Thinking: State-Supported Growth and Development 
In the period after the Great Depression of the 1930s until the late 1970s, the dominant 
mainstream economic views were informed by Keynesian economics. Keynesians 
emphasised the importance of aggregate demand as the determinant of the rate of 
savings and investment in the economy. For Keynes the state played an important role 
during economic downturn, or weak aggregate demand, because the state could 
boost aggregate demand by increasing public spending thereby reviving the economy 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 98; Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1987, pp. 131-132). This differed markedly 
from the neoliberal economics informing the Washington Consensus and post-
Washington Consensus schools. These schools informed the Bretton Woods 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that promoted 
austerity budgets and constrained state intervention from the 1980s onwards (Epstein 
& Heintz, 2006, p. 10; Fine, 2006). Therefore Keynesians promoted state-led models of 
economic growth and development whilst the Washington Consensus school of 
thought promoted market-led models of growth. 
  
Throughout this period, policy-makers in Washington preoccupied themselves with 
the “right set of policies” that the state ought to adopt in order to assist economic 
development in the context of market failure (Adam & Dercon, 2009, p. 175). As such, 
state intervention was seen as a response to market failure. The Washington 
Consensus blamed market failure on excessive state intervention and prescribed 
various measures which were meant to resolve market failure by limiting state 
intervention as part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Following the 
poor performance of the SAPs, the post-Washington Consensus had moved from 
blaming market failure on state intervention. Instead, the post-Washington Consensus 
blamed market failure on state failure, which justified the bureaucratic reforms (Saad-
Filho, 2010, pp. 6-7). Post-Washington Consensus reforms were geared at institutional 
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restructuring through the introduction of new public management and “good 
governance” principles like accountability, democratic governance and transparency. 
 
The post-Washington Consensus analysis of state failure or state “mismanagement” 
was founded on a Weberian conception of the state as a rational-bureaucratic actor in 
pursuit of public goods. The post-Washington Consensus school measured state 
‘strength’ according to how effectively the state provided public goods to its citizens. 
Good governance principles were therefore prescribed as a remedy to resolve state 
failure, which was also taken as a resolution to market failures (Saad-Filho, 2010, p. 12).  
 
Heterodox Thinking: State-Directed Growth and Development 
The aforementioned mainstream economics schools stand opposed to structuralist 
and developmental state theory schools of economic thinking which had varying 
influence across different periods and geographic regions; and whose focus was 
explicitly politics or political economy (Adam & Dercon, 2009, p. 175; Fine, 2013). From 
the late 1940s, through their work for the United Nation’s Economic Commission for 
Latin America, structural economists Celso Furtado and Raúl Prebisch highlighted the 
unequal terms of trade, divergence in income, and structural imbalance between core 
(former metropolis states) and peripheral states (former colonies).  
 
Structural economists argue that numerous underdeveloped countries, especially 
post-colonial countries in Latin America and Africa, were facing developmental 
problems related to their colonial experience and unequal integration into the global 
economy. The argument is that peripheral countries’ development was hindered by 
structural factors such as the periphery’s dependence on primary commodity exports 
in order to import higher value-added industrial goods from core countries, which 
undermines industrialisation and economic self-determination in the periphery (Hunt, 
1989). Various empirical studies have found that primary commodities are also 
characterised by volatile prices and lower income elasticity of demand which are other 
structural disadvantages facing peripheral countries (Todaro, 1996). So the structural 
school focuses is on how the distribution of power and the global political economy 
structure inhibited the economic growth and development of post-colonial countries 
(see Hirschman, 1981). 
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Structuralists argued that post-colonial or peripheral countries needed to focus on 
import-substituting industrialisation as a means for structural economic change and 
development. They saw industrialisation and technical upgrading as crucial to 
economic restructuring in order to shift the position of peripheral states to the semi-
periphery. Industrialisation allowed higher value-added production and breaking of 
the dependency to core countries; resulting in better terms of trade, higher national 
income, economic growth and greater self-determination. Therefore economic 
planning and state intervention were required to avoid inimical trends inherent in the 
process of import-substituting industrialisation such as balance of payment problems, 
sustained underemployment and poor income distribution (Szmrecsányi, 2005, pp. 
691-692; Bielschowsky, 2006, pp. 8-9).  
 
The developmental state school however focused on explaining the successful 
industrialisation of what became popularly known as the ‘Asian Miracle’ states or 
Newly Industrialised Countries of South East Asia. The developmental state theory is 
often traced back to the seminal works of Chalmers Johnson on Japan during the late 
1980s, but some of the literature predates Chalmers’ work. Developmental state 
theorists were concerned with how the state could implement a strategy of targeted 
interventions in the economy, as constituted by industrial policy, and what the state 
needed to achieve the objectives of industrial policy (Fine, 2013, pp. 2-3).  
 
The developmental state theory asserted a list of essential characteristics including: a 
strong politically-willed and technocratic elite that could intervene in the market and 
coordinate private economic interests in favour of national development goals, a civil 
society that could be subjugated, and a technocratic bureaucracy that can design and 
implement policies successfully (Gainsborough, 2009, pp. 1318-1319).  
 
The list of prescribed characteristics requires a certain level of state autonomy from 
private economic interests. However the developmental state theorists argued that the 
state should not just seek autonomy from the private sector and civil society. Instead, 
the state needed to exercise “embedded autonomy” thereby harnessing a mutually 
beneficial relationship between private and public sectors to ensure development 
(Meyns & Musamba, 2010, p. 13). The idea of embedded autonomy emphasises the 
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importance of a strong state that can insulate itself against private economic interest 
in order to promote economic growth in favour of a national development project 
(Evans, 1995, p. 50). Therefore the idea of embedded autonomy asserts the necessity 
of interconnectedness between the state and private sector to ensure a two-way flow 
of ideas and learning that benefits both the state and private sector; and ultimately 
civil society through the provision of public goods1. Moreover, the relationship 
between the state and private sector should be such that the state can insulate its 
nationalist interests (Meyns & Musamba, 2010, pp. 13-15).  
 
Methodologically, both the Keynesian and neoliberal economic schools employ 
deductive methodologies. However, the developmental state theory and structural 
economics are more eclectic and employ inductive methodology. The development of 
these discourses shows the changing and diverse views on the role of the state which 
have gradually moved from state interventionism, then “anti-state-interventionism”, 
and finally towards effective state interventionism. By the early 1990s the discourse 
had become less about the appropriate role of the state and more about the state’s 
ability to perform the role of either supporting economic growth or directing it. And 
related to this shift, great debate has been sparked by questions about how 
developments in global capitalism have affected the state role in development and 
how a country’s political economy institutions affect economic growth. 
 
A Nationalist State and Global Capitalism 
The globalisation of capitalism has influenced the emergence of the global value-
chains and shifted the focus of economists away from the state towards firms. 
Literature on GVCs emphasises the fact that many firms have become internationalised 
and that industrial production no longer occurs within one country. GVCs consist of 
the entire process of production from the raw material to end product and may be 
contained within one firm or spread across different firms (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 
2011, p. 4). In the case of a multi-firm GVC, a unique governance structure emerged 
                                              
1 According to Gainsborough (2009, p. 1321) this is what underlies the distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ developmental 
states. This therefore gives the basis for grading developmental states according to how they are effective in designing and 
implementing policies for economic development as a means for providing the public goods which include public services and 
opportunities to earn an income. 
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characterised by a lead firm and follower firms with have varying degrees of vertical 
integration (Figure 3 below).  
 
Lead firms are usually closer to the end product and focus strongly on design and 
marketing of the final product; whilst the follower firms focus on repetitive productive 
tasks based on lead firms’ designs and intellectual property (Kaplinsky, 2000, p. 128; 
Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011, p. 10). Through varying degrees of vertical integration 
the lead firm may use suppliers of turnkey inputs, or relational suppliers which produce 
inputs according to the lead firm’s specifications, or captive suppliers which only 
supply the lead firm, or even fully integrated suppliers that are subsidiaries of the lead 
firm (Figure 3 below). 
 
Figure 3: Five Global Value-Chain Governance Types 
 
(Source: Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011, p. 11) 
 
GVCs have resulted in an asymmetrical balance of power which tends to favour lead 
firms and the development of follower firms often depends on the lead firms it 
supplies. Therefore industrial policy will almost always benefit lead firms more than it 
does follower firms, and it has to be so given that follower firms depend on the lead 
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firms. Therefore to develop follower firms the state should direct its effects to 
developing lead firms which has a knock-on effect of developing follower firms 
through the supply demands from lead firms. However, given that lead firms can 
source inputs internationally depending on the location of follower firms within their 
GVC, lead firms’ sourcing decisions often undermine industrial policy aimed at 
developing follower firms if there are no policy control mechanisms to discourage 
foreign sourcing of inputs.  
 
In addition, GVCs diminish the possible impact of industrial policy and the means for 
technological upgrading of follower firms. Firms upgrade by achieving the ability to 
supply multinational corporations or by accessing infrastructure, expertise and 
capacity necessary to establish a production relationship with lead firms. On the other 
hand, firms also upgrade by participating in different value-chain activities with higher 
value-added (Kaplinsky, 2000, p. 127). This undermines industrial policy aimed at 
follower firms because there is little feedback from follower firms’ production on what 
production processes would lead to upgrading since the only feedback is based on 
lead firms’ demands. Given the dependence of follower firms upon lead firms, 
technological upgrading of follower firms depends on the supply demands of lead 
firms. Therefore industrial policy needs to support research and development by lead 
firms, but this doesn’t guarantee technical upgrading for local follower firms because 
that depends on whether lead firms decide to source inputs locally or not. And this 
means that industrial policy unfairly benefits multinational corporations because the 
state directly or indirectly subsidises intellectual property investment by multinational 
corporations. 
 
The most beneficial industrial policy response for a developing country’s economy is 
to establish “local champions” which will enter the global economy as lead firms and 
establish their own GVCs. But the prospects of doing so are slim for most developing 
countries since developing countries often provide the labour and raw materials, whilst 
developed countries usually focus on design and marketing (Gereffi & Fernandez-
Stark, 2011, p. 7). This structural dynamic of GVC firm relations makes it difficult for 
follower firms to upgrade to high value-added activities and determines the relative 
gains amongst countries (Kaplinsky, 2000, p. 127). 
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Institutional Political Economy 
Some strands of the developmental state theory school discussed above fall within a 
broader category of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature which has sparked 
much debate in institutional political economy. The VoC approach emphasises that 
capitalism has taken on various forms depending on the society and its institutional 
make-up. The main thrust of this theoretical strand is that institutions are instrumental 
in determining the performance of capitalism (Adam & Dercon, 2009, pp. 174-175).  
 
Earlier variations of the VoC literature focused on the institutional make-up of the state 
to explain its capacity to implement economic policies aimed at industrial 
development, which ostensibly influenced the developmental state literature. 
Although this state-centred approach was crucial in placing the state as the main actor, 
it has been criticised for understating the role and influence of non-state actors and 
their corresponding impact on the society’s institutional make-up. This resulted in the 
emergence of a society-centred analysis which highlighted that non-state actors 
influenced policy through individual interest articulation or through lobbying as 
members of associations or trade unions in the case of labour (Kang, 2006, pp. 4-5).  
 
Noting changes in the global economy and the growing influence of firms, the VoC 
shifted focus towards firm-centred analysis. It is understood that individual firms’ 
behaviour aggregates into “national economic performance” (Hall & Gingerich, 2004, 
p. 7). In this view of the VoC, the main challenge of firms is coordination. The 
institutional make-up of the economy is defined by the interaction of firms, which can 
be market-orientated or strategic interaction, and the overall market conditions that 
are either liberal or coordinated. Liberal market economies (LMEs) are characterised by 
greater deregulation, asset fluidity, competitive inter-firm relations and the operation 
of supply and demand dynamics moderated through the price mechanism. Whereas 
coordinated markets economies (CMEs) are characterised by a greater reliance on non-
market interactions, strategic relations, cooperation and credible commitments which 
often need to be institutionally supported (Kang, 2006, p. 3). The VoC literature asserts 
that, in a LME with little support for credible commitments, relations amongst firms 
and other actors will be coordinated by competitive market interactions; whereas in a 
CME with support for credible commitments the relations will be coordinated by 
strategic interactions (Hall & Gingerich, 2004, p. 8).  
29 
 
 
 
The literature uses the examples of the United States and Germany to explicate the 
difference between a CME and LME, and firms’ interaction and coordination. The 
United States is argued as a typical LME with weak trade unions and greater asset 
fluidity, therefore managers are more sensitive to current profitability because equity 
markets are public information and firms compete and access finance based on their 
market valuation. In addition, because labour markets are fluid, workers find the 
incentive to invest in their own upskilling and professional development in order to 
compete for and secure work. And managers have the prerogative to hire and fire at 
will, prefer labour with general skills due to asset fluidity, and spend less on training. 
Relations between management and labour are competitive and contractually driven. 
On the other hand, Germany is argued as a typical CME with strong trade unions and 
firms invested in specific assets. In addition, because firms are members of influential 
associations and there is a greater firm interconnectedness. Managers are less sensitive 
to current profitability because their membership to various networks gives them 
access to greater market information and access to finance based on their 
connectedness and reputation (Hall & Gingerich, 2004, pp. 8-9).  
 
In addition there are various arguments as to how institutions affect economic 
outcomes. For the VoC, a shock resulting in declining returns in a CME will lead owners 
of movable assets to reinvest elsewhere whilst owners of immovable assets will be 
compelled to lobby for the current productive activities they are invested in. Whereas, 
in a LME, the response to a decline in returns will be to shift assets towards other 
productive activities. And the state will rely on market mechanisms such as adjusting 
prices and wages to adjust to the shock; leading to greater inequality which is likely to 
result in ‘class struggle’ in the form industrial action (Hall & Gingerich, 2004, p. 33). 
What matters is the dynamic response and the relations between firms which 
determine the economic outcomes. 
 
There have been various critiques of the VoC literature. Firstly it has been criticised for 
lacking variety because most countries do not completely or strictly fit the 
characterisation as an LME or CME (Kang, 2006, pp. 11-12). Secondly, what can be said 
of hybrid states which are best characterised as a mixture of LME and CME? Lastly, the 
predominantly firm-centred approach of the contemporary VoC discourse places pre-
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eminence on the firm as the key agent of change in the economy, completely 
overlooking the power of the state and labour. And state- and society-centred 
approaches also understated the role of firms in economic coordination (Kang, 2006, 
p. 10). However, because the VoC literature emphasises coordination, the literature 
provides invaluable insights regarding the dynamic aspects of industrial policy-making 
and implementation. The VoC insight that economic policy challenges are 
challenges of coordinating actors is crucial. This is relevant for South Africa’s 
industrial policy which is essentially challenged by the coordination of key stakeholders 
around a certain desired policy outcome. 
 
The VoC literature uses a very broad definition of institutions as any formal or informal 
man-made rules that organise interactions and exchange. This makes it challenging to 
understand what exactly institutions are given this broad definition. Nevertheless, the 
VoC literature uses three frameworks for understanding institutions, namely that: 
institutions determine social relations by establishing a set of norms or rules 
governing social behaviour; secondly that institutions are derived from the power 
given to certain actors by virtue of organisational hierarchical hegemony; and 
lastly that institutions arise from a complex set of incentives to which agents 
respond (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 5). 
 
Contribution of this Study 
The objective of this study is to understand how specific institutions have impacted 
the economic outcomes and performance of the state’s attempts to promote 
investment and increase local production in the automotive sector through its 
industrial policy. In understanding institutions the research draws from the VoC 
literature discussed above. By so doing the study contributes a vital perspective in the 
body of literature on the role of the South African state in industrial development. 
 
In addition this study seeks to examine the coherence of the automotive sector 
industrial policy in relation to the broader policy environment and in relation to the 
institutional context. This is necessary to provide a deeper evaluation of the industrial 
policy that is sensitive to the coordination problems facing the state. Moreover, this is 
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necessary to understand certain outcomes of the nexus of industrial policy and 
corporate strategy. 
  
Lastly, the study was undertaken as the state implements its new phase in the 
automotive sector’s industrial policy which started in 2013. This allows the study to 
critically reflect on the previous period, make an assessment of the changes made in 
the current period and conjecture on the outlook given the current conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
Chapter Three: Methodology and Method 
Methodology 
This study takes on methodological holism as its theoretical perspective in answering 
its key questions. The central argument is built on the premise that structures are 
preeminent over agents, but not necessarily excluding the impact of the agents on the 
structure (Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 13). Therefore the economy is made of institutions 
and social structures that define social relations prescribing the way individuals 
behave, and those institutions and structures are also created and affected by 
individuals.  
 
Institutions are sets of formal and informal rules defining the social relations amongst 
people, whilst organisations are social structures that administer these rules and react 
to needs (Goetz, 2006, p. 71). In the context of the economy, examples of institutions 
and social structures could be: a tariff rate policy and the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) which exercises tariff rules its Customs; or principles of solidarity in the 
form of collective action and trade unions2. The inquiry into the role of the state in the 
development of the South African automotive sector is informed by this theoretical 
foundation.  
 
In the discussion, however, this is contrasted with some of the VoC approaches 
founded on methodological individualism, which emphasises the pre-eminence of the 
agent over the structure in defining society and human behaviour; making the 
structure, such as society, an aggregation of individuals (see Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 
109).  
 
Method 
The research examines the institutional political economy of industrial policy within 
the automotive sector by specifically focusing on labour, OEMs, automotive 
component producers, the Department of Trade and Industry (the dti) which 
administers the automotive sector’s industrial policy, and one state agency involved in 
                                              
2 See Gernetzky, 2014. “Seven of COSATU’s Affiliates Threaten to Leave Federation over NUMSA Expulsion”, Business Day, 27 
November 2014. 
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industrial policy at various levels. This is done through primary and secondary research. 
The primary research involved unstructured and structured interviews with 
representatives from organised labour, automotive firms, government agencies and 
departments, academics, and consultants working on the sector. The secondary 
research involved analysis of the literature, government policy documents and 
performance reports.  
 
Context of the Research Study 
The study takes place within the Republic of South Africa, specifically in Gauteng, 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal. And the study is limited to the analysis of passenger 
and light commercial vehicle segments of the automotive value-chain, which excludes 
medium and heavy commercial vehicles since there has been little focus on this 
segment in terms of industrial policy until 2014 with the introduction of the Medium 
and Heavy Commercial Vehicle AIS (MHCV-AIS)3.  
 
Interviewees of the study are representatives from: the dti, OEMs, component 
producers from top-six exported component categories, the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) which represent most of the labour force 
employed by OEMs, sector improvement and benchmarking clubs, the National 
Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA), academia and 
civil servants. This sample of representatives from all the key stakeholders allows for a 
thorough and critical analysis of the institutions of the political economy of industrial 
policy in the automotive sector. 
 
OEMs 
The OEMs below have been chosen because the firms have diverse characteristics and 
target markets as indicated by the disaggregated data on new vehicle sales over the 
past two years. Toyota South Africa Motors (TSAM) has high local market penetration 
in passenger vehicles and yet has almost equal distribution between export and 
domestic market sales for light commercial vehicles (Figures 4&5 below). TSAM is also 
mainly focused on the lower income consumers. On the other hand, Mercedes-Benz 
                                              
3 See Kolver, 2014. “Davies Approves MHCV-AIS Guidelines”, Engineering News, 24 November 2014. 
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South Africa (MBSA) produces for the higher income consumers and MBSA is export-
focused. Both OEMs produced above 50 000 units in the past two years (Figure 4 
below). 
 
Figure 4: New Passenger Vehicle Import/Export Numbers (Relative Share/Units) 
                   
(Author’s Calculations, Data Source: NAAMSA, 2013/14a) 
 
MBSA produces negligible volumes of LCVs exclusively for the domestic market whilst 
TSAM produces a substantial volume for bother domestic and export markets (Figure 
5 below). This sample allows for an interrogation of the common argument that there 
hasn’t been significant investment in local component production because local 
producers are uncompetitive and cannot meet global standards and consumer 
demands. 
 
Figure 5: New LCV Import/Export Numbers (Relative Share/Units) 
 
                     
(Author’s Calculations, Data Source: NAAMSA, 2013/14a) 
 
In addition, in terms of ownership, these companies show the full spectrum of 
ownership that has also changed over time. MBSA used to be owned under a joint 
venture between Daimler AG and Volkskas Bank, from 1988 until 1995, and was then 
wholly-owned by Daimler AG with headquarters in Germany (Barnes, 2013, p. 9). 
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Meanwhile TSAM went from 100% local-ownership to being wholly-owned by Toyota 
Motor Corporation with headquarter in Japan through its holding company Toyota 
South Africa (Barnes, 2013, p. 9; TSAM, 2013, p. 4). 
 
This allows for a thorough analysis of the true impact of the state’s investment 
incentives on a firm that has had a long-standing capital structure. And given the 
changed structure of capital in TSAM and MBSA, it would be useful to examine the 
role played by the state – if any – in the sales of assets to foreign investors. The study 
only analyses two of the seven OEMs with productive capacity in South Africa. But this 
is not an insurmountable shortcoming because the study covers both German and 
Japanese producers which are the currently predominant influences in the automotive 
sector. The predominant influences change slowly over time depending on the 
dominance of certain sources of foreign capital (Duncan, 1992b, p. 7).  
 
Component Producers 
This study considers component manufacturers producing catalytic converters, engine 
parts, stitched leather parts, transmission shafts, and automotive tooling. This group 
of components has been chosen because it represents over 50% of the automotive 
component exports, and they are amongst the top ten component imports accounting 
for over 30% of all component imports (see Table 1 and Table 2 Below). In addition, 
this grouping includes categories of components that are predominantly imported 
such as automotive tooling, and some that are mostly exported such as catalytic 
converters and other intermediate variations (Figure 6 below). 
 
Table 1: Top 10 Component Exports by Category (R Million, 2010-2013) 
Component Category 2010 2011 2012 2013 % of Total 
Export Value 
2013 
Ranking 
Catalytic Converters 14 761 19 639 16 347 17 641 41,8% 1 
Engine Parts 1 505 2 058 2 875 3 189 7,6% 2 
Tyres 1 133 1 675 1 522 1 842 4,4% 3 
Stitched Leather Parts 2 898 2 190 1 719 1 530 3,6% 4 
Silencers / Exhausts 1 696 2 139 1 730 1 225 2,9% 5 
Transmission Shafts / Cranks 415 569 771 926 2,2% 6 
Automotive Tooling 447 438 782 777 1,8% 7 
Shock Absorbers / Suspension Parts 329 430 440 474 1,1% 8 
Road Wheels / Parts 383 494 466 455 1,1% 9 
Gauges / Instruments/ Parts 241 319 401 435 1,0% 10 
(Source: AIEC, 2014, p. 49) 
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Table 2: Top 10 Component Imports (R Million, 2010-2013) 
Component Category 2010 2011 2012 2013 % of Total 
Export Value 
2013 
Ranking 
Automotive Tooling 1 596 2 369 2 798 4 090 9,48% 1 
Tyres 2 900 3 206 3 610 3 990 9,25% 2 
Engine Parts 2 549 2 960 3 074 3 546 8,22% 3 
Transmission Shafts / Cranks 1 076 1 302 1 414 1 774 4,11% 4 
Gauges / Instrument Parts 984 1 244 1 303 1 607 3,72% 5 
Stitched Leather Parts 1 139 1 138 1 206 1 543 3,58% 6 
Engines 705 1 181 1 243 1 361 3,15% 7 
Brake Parts 774 918 887 1 116 2,59% 8 
Lighting Equipment / Parts 746 805 746 933 2,16% 9 
Catalytic Converters 903 823 627 892 2,07% 10 
(Source: AIEC, 2014, p. 74) 
 
Figure 6: Relative Import-Export Ratios by Component Category (2010-2013) 
 
(Author’s Calculation, Data Source: AIEC, 2014) 
 
The following list of producers was chosen: Microfinish (automotive tooling), Benteler 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd (catalytic converters), C & J Services (engine parts), Aunde Tap 
(Pty) Ltd (stitched leather parts), GKN Sinter Metal (transmission shafts), Ramsay 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd (stitched leather parts). 
 
Labour 
NUMSA is the primary trade union representing over 330 000 metalworkers in the 
automotive and related sectors. NUMSA’s membership is concentrated in OEMs and, 
according to NUMSA, over 90% of wage-earning OEM employees being NUMSA 
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members4. In the components segment of the sector there has been some 
deindustrialisation, and much smaller levels of unionisation due to size of firms which 
discourages labour from organising5. 
 
NUMSA sits on the Motor Industry Development Council (MIDC) and the MIDC 
Monitoring Committee where various stakeholders give quarterly reports on the 
performance of the automotive sector6. NUMSA also has influence in the policy space 
as a stakeholder on the MIDC, the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council and the various bargaining councils. This makes NUMSA an important 
stakeholder in the automotive sector. 
 
Government, Associations and Scholars 
Given that the dti is mandated to control the country’s industrial policy, this study also 
interviews representatives from the dti. However, the dti is not the only state agency 
working on development of the automotive sector. There are other various provincial 
and local government departments and government agencies involved as well. 
Therefore this study interviewed representatives from the Durban Auto Cluster in 
KwaZulu Natal and the Automotive Industry Development Centre and Automotive 
industry Supplier Park in Gauteng. This study has also interviewed former academic 
and current Chief Director: Industrial Cluster at the Gauteng Department of Economic 
Development, Dr David Masondo. 
 
Automotive associations are also very important in the sector. Therefore this study has 
interviewed Dr Norman Lamprecht who is the Executive Director at NAAMSA. NAAMSA 
is an automotive association for OEMs in South Africa. And NAAMSA’s membership 
base now includes major importers and distributors of new vehicles as well as local 
manufacturers and assemblers7. However, due to various constraints the study was not 
able to interview a representative from the National Association of Automotive 
Component & Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM). Nevertheless, the variety in 
                                              
4 Interview with Mrs Neo Bodibe, NUMSA: Strategic Support to the General Secretary. 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
5 Interview with Mr Tengo Tengela, NUMSA: Senior Researcher: Industrial and Trade Policy. 31 October 2014, Johannesburg 
6 Interview with NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
7 Interview with Dr Norman Lamprecht, NAAMSA: Executive Director. 29 September 2014, Centurion. 
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interviewees’ firms provides the spectrum of inputs directly from the different 
segments of industry. 
 
In addition, this study interviewed Professor Justin Barnes who is one of the key 
academics and consultants working on the automotive sector. As a co-founder of 
Benchmarking and Manufacturing (B&M) Analysts, Barnes’s work focuses on the 
development of benchmarking and cluster facilitation models and methodologies so 
as to enhance the competitiveness of manufacturing firms; whilst also reviewing and 
developing new industrial policies for local, regional and national governments. Barnes 
was interviewed in his capacity as the Executive Director at B&M Analysts and an 
Adjunct Professor at the University KwaZulu Natal. 
 
Each interviewee was treated as a ‘key informant’, as someone who has worked for a 
significant automotive firm, association or state agency which has had various 
engagements with the state and its industrial policy administration; whose knowledge 
and opinions may provide some insight into the wider organisational and institutional 
environment in which the state operates. However, the interviewees were not 
uncritically assumed to be a simple conduit for data. Despite this, the interviewees 
were not able to provide extensive quantitative data on firms because some of the 
information is confidential. This was a major drawback of the interviews conducted – 
however the study has relied on public data as an illustration and justification for most 
of the arguments put forward.  
 
And although the number of interviews and the details provided are constraints, this 
is natural for institutional political economy research. The study still provides some 
intriguing insights which can be further interrogated or confirmed with the availability 
of firm-level data. Nevertheless, the number and range of interviews covering most of 
the relevant organisations is sufficient for the qualitative institutional analysis pursued 
in this study. 
 
Beyond these challenges, which the study has tried to mitigate, there is also a drawback 
in the level of “freedom” that interviewees had during the interview. Interviewees 
cannot be assumed to have responded to questions freely and with full honesty. In 
fact some interviewees requested to be “off the record” before providing some of the 
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crucial yet confidential information related to the study. In addition to this, 
interviewees cannot be assumed to have freely and honestly provided information that 
jeopardises their personal interests, violates contractual commitments or compromises 
strategic relationships. As such, the research faced institutional challenges to attaining 
full information. However, where possible, the study gained access to enough 
documentation and information from other sources to triangulate and corroborate 
some of the information received from interviews. Where this was not possible, the 
study has avoided drawing strong positions from insufficient or biased information. 
 
Table 3: Interviews Conducted 
 Date Interviewee Organisation Position/Title 
1 14 August 2014 Mr Mkhululi Mlota Department of Trade and Industry Chief Director: Automotive  
2 14 August 2014 
Mr Coenraad 
Bezuidenhout 
Manufacturing Circle Executive Director 
3 1 September 2014 Dr David Masondo 
Gauteng Department of Economic 
Development 
Chief Director: Sector and 
Industry 
4 25 September 2014 Prof Justin Barnes 
Benchmarking and Manufacturing 
Analysts (Pty) Ltd/ University of 
KwaZulu Natal 
Executive Chairman/ Adjunct 
Professor 
5 29 September 2014 Dr Norman Lamprecht 
National Association of Automobile 
Manufacturers of South Africa 
Executive Manager 
6 15 October 2014 Mr Deshan Naidoo Factocode (Pty) Ltd T/A Microfinish Marketing & Strategy Manager 
7 15 October 2014 Mr Ralph Streitbürger Benteler South Africa (Pty) Ltd Director of Sales 
8 15 October 2014 Mr Jon Kerr GKN Sinter Metals Cape Town (Pty) Ltd Director of Sales and Marketing 
9 15 October 2014 Mr Angus Anderson Ramsay Engineering (Pty) Ltd Joint CEO 
10 15 October 2014 Mr Samuel Mooketsi 
Automotive Industry Development 
Centre 
Business Development Officer: 
Infrastructure 
11 20 October 2014 Mr Stuart Naysmith Aunde Tap (Pty) Ltd 
Manager: Production and Key 
Accounts 
12 21 October 2014 
Ms Laurie Coyle-
Dowling 
Durban Auto Cluster/ B&M Analysts Cluster Manager 
13 23 October 2014 Mr Mitch Cowie C&J Services (Pty) Ltd 
Manager: Market, Sales and 
Export 
14 23 October 2014 Mr Sham Ramdas Toyota South Africa Motors 
Senior Co-ordinator: Purchasing, 
Engineering and Planning 
15 30 October 2014 Mr Tengo Tengela 
Nation Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa 
Senior Researcher: Industrial and 
Trade Policy 
16 10 November 2014 
Mr Logan Naidoo, Mr 
Theo Govender, Mr 
Julian Pillay 
Toyota South Africa Motors 
Senior Manager: Purchasing, 
Engineering and Planning 
17 19 November 2014 Ms Neo Bodibe 
Nation Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa 
Strategic Support to the General 
Secretary 
18 5 December 2014 Mr Mkhululi Mlota Department of Trade and Industry Chief Director: Automotive  
19 18 December 2014 Mr Tiyo Kakaza Mercedes Benz South Africa Robotics Support Technician 
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Chapter Four: Findings and Discussion 
Institutional context of industrial policy-making 
The social structures for industrial policy-making and implementation are built on the 
CME institutional structure using a corporatist approach to articulate different 
stakeholder interests. An example of this would be the MIDC and the MIDC Monitoring 
Committee which meet quarterly to give reports on the different segments of the 
automotive sector, i.e. labour, components production and vehicle manufacturing. This 
form of consultative approach which limits state engagement to the level of 
associations was done as a way to overcome collusion or politically expedient bias8. 
These associations therefore engage with the state in reviews and development of the 
industrial policy. The state also privately consults with NAAMSA and NAACAM to find 
out what sort of policy changes and state support would best benefit the automotive 
sector as a whole. Collaboratively the state and automotive associations set various 
targets and development focuses such as production, assembly, infrastructure etc. 
 
Figure 7: Members of the MIDC 
 
(Source: Interview with the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton.) 
The CCIG, as the name suggests, is a lobby group for catalytic converter producers, 
some of whom have a stake in platinum mining. The group also represents a majority 
                                              
8 Interviews with: Mr Mkhululi Mlota, Department of Trade and Industry: Chief Director: Auto Sector. 14 August 2014, Sandton; 
Mr Coenraad Bezuidenhout, Manufacturing Circle: Executive Director. 18 August 2014, Johannesburg. 
MIDC
Catalytic Converter Interest Group (CCIG)
International Trade Administration Centre (ITAC)
NAAMSA
NAACAM
NUMSA
SARS
South African Tyre Manufacturers Conference (SATMC)
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of the local OEMs. The CCIG entered the MIDC along with the SATMC as “vulnerable 
components” which made them eligible for the greatest value of state incentives 
during the transition from MIDP to APDP9.  The SATMC is a producer-group of market 
and environmental lobbyists. The SATMC entered the MIDC as a results of strong 
lobbying after repeatedly losing a dumping case against cheaper Chinese tyre 
imports10. ITAC administers the tariff and trade regime along with all applications for 
tariff rate changes. The rest of the MIDC members have already been introduced. 
 
Industrial policy arises from strategic interactions between the state and other parties 
involved. The state often engages with auto firms through associations and collective 
platforms such as the MIDC and the Automotive Supply Chain Competitiveness 
Initiative (ASCCI). The MIDC is chaired by the dti and focuses on sector-wide issues 
through consultation. The MIDC consortium also participates in the ASCCI platform, 
which is facilitated by B&M Analysts, coordinating all competitiveness issues in the 
industry focused on firm-level upgrading, skills development, market access and 
sharing of expertise11. ASCCI’s other work includes coordination of automotive sector 
special economic zones, focus areas from the Automotive Purchasing Council such as 
retention of current local content and resolving competitiveness challenges of local 
suppliers, and global developments in the sector12. ASCCI is co-funded by government 
and other stakeholders. Beyond this, the dti creates ad hoc forums which convene on 
case-by-case basis, i.e. the APDP Review. 
 
The final industrial policy and its parameters are determined by the power relations 
between all stakeholders. Even though all stakeholders in the sector have an input 
through the MIDC, OEMs have a lot of weight and a strong voice. Other stakeholders 
are constrained by South Africa’s position in the global economy and geopolitics13. 
 
                                              
9 See Cokayne, 2012. “Policy Vacuum Knocks Exports”, Indepedent Online, 19 June 2012; Venter, 2014. “Catalytic Converter 
Industry ‘Dying’, Platinum Tax Possible Saviour – NAACAM”, Engineering News, 17 February 2014 
10 See The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 2010; Payne, 2011. “Tyre Industry Left Threadbare”, Mail and Gaurdian, 26 
August 2011; Payne, 2011. “Tyre Industry Reels from 'Blowout'”, Mail and Guardian, 7 October 2011. 
11 Interview with Prof. Justin Barnes, Benchmarking and Manufacturing Analysts: Executive Director & University of KwaZulu Natal: 
Adjunct Professor. 25 September 2014, Skype™. 
12 Interview with the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton. 
13 Interview with the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton. The WTO complaint against Australia’s support to automotive leather producers 
and the relocation of all OEMs from Australia are some of the global economy and geopolitical influences that have affected the 
state’s approach to industrial policy.  
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OEMs 
OEMs have the strongest influence on industrial policy as a result of their organising 
ability and their position in the hierarchy of the automotive sector. All OEMs producing 
in South Africa are members of NAAMSA which represents around 43 manufacturers 
and importers of light motor vehicles and various types of commercial vehicles. The 
association represents the collective interest of its constituency14. Industrial policy has 
been strongly influenced by OEMs lobbying15. However, the fact that, until recently, 
industrial policy only supported the production of light motor vehicles shows that the 
interests of all NAAMSA members are not always met and that there might be internal 
bargaining for voice on which issues NAAMSA lobbies for. Nevertheless, industrial 
policy now supports investment in passenger vehicles through the People-carrier AIS 
and supports medium and heavy commercial vehicles through the MHCV-AIS16. This 
also shows the effectiveness of the organising and lobbying ability of OEMs which has 
resulted in the introduction of key state incentives to serve a wider spectrum of 
NAAMSA members.  
 
The state’s policy-making process and approach to resolving industry challenges faced 
is always consultative17. NAAMSA comes up with a solution, then consults with 
NAACAM to draw up a collective solution before consulting the state (the dti). 
However, OEMs have a stronger influence on industrial policy due to the resources and 
position in the hierarchical organisation of the sector. OEMs’ resources allow them to 
make relatively larger investments therefore by default they extract the largest value 
from resources relative to component producers. Given that the value of investments 
by OEMs is relatively larger, directly resulting in relatively more jobs, and indirectly 
creating jobs in component production – OEMs have much greater bargaining power 
with the state18. Hence the threat of relocation or halting plans for expansion are often 
                                              
14 Interview with NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, Centurion. 
15 Interviews with: Manufacturing Circle, 18 August 2014, Johannesburg; B&M Analysts (Pty) Ltd/ University of KwaZulu Natal, 25 
September 2014, Skype™; Mr Mitch Cowie, C&J Services (Pty) Ltd: Manager: Market, Sales and Export. 23 October 2014, Durban; 
NUMSA, 31 October 2014, Johannesburg; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. The influence of OEMs in the automotive 
sector is well-researched. Primary interviews also revealed that industrial policy proposals providing greater benefits for the 
domestic producers and the economy have been adjusted to favour the interest of OEMs during the review process resulting in 
the APDP. Moreover, the incentives structure has always been skewed towards favouring OEMs because state subsidies are 
commensurate with the value of investment.  
16 Interview with Manufacturing Circle, 18 August 2014, Johannesburg. See South African Government News Agency, 2014. “SA 
Stimulates Investment in Vehicle Production”, SAnews.gov.za, 24 November 2014; South African Government News Agency, 2015. 
“DTI Welcomes Launch of Toyota Plant”, SAnews.gov.za, 23 June 2015.   
17 Interviews with: the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton; NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, Centurion. 
18 Interviews with: the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton; Manufacturing Circle, 18 August 2014, Johannesburg; NAAMSA, 29 September 
2014, Centurion; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
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tools used by OEMs to settle bargains with both labour and the state19. The bargaining 
power of OEMs is also reinforced by their position in the hierarchical structure of the 
automotive sector. 
 
The automotive industry is internationalised and organised according to the GVCs of 
multinational parent OEMs. All OEMs producing in South Africa are now subsidiaries 
of multinational parent companies20. Local OEMs’ sourcing decisions are made by 
parent OEMs based on the retail price of the car and where it is exported - they are 
much less interested in the health of local subsidiary assemblers or localising inputs21. 
As such local OEMs are positioned as lead firms whilst the all component producers 
are integrated as follower firms in the OEMs’ supply chain. Most component producers 
supplying OEMs are either fully integrated subsidiaries of OEMs, multinational 
sourcing partners to OEMs, or in a few cases locally-owned suppliers22. 
 
In the past component producers were able to access government incentives for their 
exports and investments but this led to adverse effects of continued reliance on 
imports and trading of import duty rebate credit certificates (IRCCs)23. Consequently, 
government incentives were not resulting in greater localisation and further job-
creation. Hence, as a way to try and ensure localisation and job-creation, the state 
responded by administering industrial policy through OEMs and now exclusively offers 
production incentives to OEMs based on their level of local value-addition24. However, 
the state is already facing challenges regarding the definition and measure for local 
value-added that OEMs are claiming which undermines the policy objectives25. 
                                              
19 See Reuters, 2013. “NUMSA Rejects BMW 'Blackmail'”, fin24.com, 7 October 2013; SAPA, 2013. “Davies: BMW Not Going 
Anywhere”, fin24.com, 9 October 2013.   
20 Interviews with: the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton; Manufacturing Circle, 18 August 2014, Johannesburg; NAAMSA, 29 September 
2014, Centurion; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
21 Interviews with: NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, Centurion; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
22 Interviews with: Mr Angus Anderson, Ramsay Engineering (Pty) Ltd: Joint CEO. 15 October 2014, Midrand; Mr Deshan Naidoo, 
Factocode (Pty) Ltd T/A Microfinish: Marketing & Strategy Manager. 15 October 2014, Midrand; Mr Jon Kerr, GKN Sinter Metals 
Cape Town (Pty) Ltd: Director of Sales and Marketing. 15 October 2014, Mirdand; Mr Ralph Streitbürger, Benteler South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd: Director of Sales. 15 October 2014, Midrand; Mr Stuart Naysmith, Aunde Tap: Production Manager/Key Accounts. 20 
October 2014, Durban. Component producers supplying OEMs usually operate under “build-to-print” licences from OEMs which 
means they produce components according to specifications and designs provided and owned by OEMs. In instances where 
component producers are involved in research and development, the OEM usually bares the cost in return for ownership of the 
intellectual property. However, generally, component producers are not involved in product design.  
23 Interviews with: the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton; NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, Centurion; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, 
Johannesburg. 
24 Interviews with: the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton; NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, Centurion. The state’s justification for 
administering the APDP incentives through OEMs is that this will ensure localisation. On the other hand the state also does not 
have capacity to administer incentives for all component producers through the dti therefore there is an efficiency justification as 
well.  
25 Interviews with: Mr Sham Ramdas, TSAM: Senior Coordinator - Purchasing, Engineering and Planning. 23 October 2014, 
Prospecton; Mr Julian Pillay, Mr Theo Govender & Mr Logan Naidoo, TSAM: Senior Coordinators - Purchasing, Engineering and 
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More importantly this has inadvertently improved the bargaining power of OEMs and 
their influence on industrial policy. For instance some smaller OEMs do not produce 
the required level of 50 000 units per annum but the state still provides incentives to 
them because of their indirect impact on jobs through their supply-chain26. Therefore 
OEMs have strong bargaining power because of their direct importance for domestic 
jobs and indirect job-creation through their supply chains. This suggests that OEMs’ 
threat of relocation or halting planned expansion is seen as credible by the state. In 
addition the state relies on OEMs for information on the sector which is crucial for 
monitoring and evaluating the automotive sector’s industrial policy27. Therefore these 
institutional aspects of industrial policy-making and implementation further bolster 
the bargaining power and influence of OEMs.  
 
Hence, OEMs have the strongest influence on industrial policy as a result of their 
organising ability, financial resources and their position in the hierarchical structure of 
the automotive sector. 
 
Component Producers 
NAACAM represents approximately 190 component producers from first-tier suppliers 
to OEMs and suppliers to the aftermarket. Some parts of the automotive component 
industry also have experts and lobby groups dealing with sub-sector specific industry 
challenges such as the South African Automotive Tooling Association, the SATMC, the 
CCIG, and the Auto Industry Export Council (AIEC). The AIEC is an umbrella body linking 
production to export for the entire automotive sector, and NAAMSA has part-time 
presence on its council28.  
 
                                              
Planning. 10 November 2014, Conference Call. OEMs use a price-measure which means the level of local content depends on the 
price of the parts and components used. This practice also runs the risk of underpricing components and parts from OEM 
subsidiaries, imported or otherwise, in order to achieve a higher level of local content (higher value-added) and extract greater 
value from the incentives.  
26 Interview with the dti, 5 December 2014, Pretoria. 
27 The Automotive Sector Chief Directorate at the dti only has access to NAAMSA-provided disaggregated OEM production data, 
and relies on the Automotive Export Manual which is also produced from disaggregated components production data provided 
by NAAMSA affiliates. Moreover, during the course of this study, most useful responses to requests for sector data from NAACAM 
and the dti were referrals to aggregated data sourced from NAAMSA.  
28 Interview with NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, Centurion. 
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The component producers have varying bargaining power and organising ability 
depending on their specific market size and the nature of production. Components 
with few local producers have had greater organising ability and industrial policy 
lobbying influence; especially components produced by multinational firms. For 
example, the SATMC and CCIG have presence on the MIDC which is unusual given that 
the state prefers engaging industry at the association level29. However these two lobby 
groups, which consist of a small number of multinational producers30, have been able 
to assert their interest at the individual component group level and encourage a 
pluralistic approach to industry-state engagement. At the association level there is a 
competition for voice on industrial policy influence. NAACAM ultimately prioritises 
issues faced by component subgroups represented by third-party associations like the 
SATMC, CCIG and Valve and Actuator Manufacturers Cluster of South Africa 
(VAMCOSA) which have the strongest voice and influence over industrial policy 
amongst component producers.  
 
With regards to the distribution of gains and the outcome of bargaining for policy 
influence or state support, component producers have come second-best to OEMs. 
And, because the state’s approach to industrial policy has not differentiated amongst 
automotive component, when benefits have been withdrawn from the component 
industry all producers have been affected. The state’s undifferentiated approach to 
dealing with automotive components in industrial policy has resulted in strong 
competition for policy influence and state support. However, the strong voice of some 
interest groups have been able to capture state support from different sources beyond 
the automotive sector industrial policy.  
 
Through strong lobbying some component groupings such as the VAMCOSA have 
been able to capture state support through preferential procurement, or designation31. 
Under the Preferential Public Procurement Financial Management Act the state can 
designate vulnerable components with varying levels of required localisation32. 
                                              
29 Interview with the dti, 5 Decemeber 2014, Pretoria. 
30 These two lobby groups represent industries that mostly dominated by foreign multinational automotive firms. See Doneva, 
2009. "SA Autocat Sector Calls for Help”, fin24.com. 11 February 2009; SATMC, n.d. “Our Members”, South African Tyre 
Manufacturers Conference.  
31 Interview with Microfinish, 15 October 2014, Midrand. 
32 Some of the products that are designated for local procurement (but at different levels of localisation) includes: Bus Bodies; 
Textile, Clothing, Leather and Footwear; Steel Power Pylons; Rail Rolling Stock; Set Top Boxes; Office Furniture; School Furniture; 
Solar Water Heater Components; Electrical and telecom cables; Valves products and Actuators; Prepaid Electricity Meters; Post 
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Therefore the VAMCOSA benefits from having a certain portion of state procurement 
of valves and actuators being allocated towards local producers. Meanwhile the CCIG 
has argued that catalytic converter manufacturers contribute towards industrial 
development through the beneficiation of the platinum group metals used to produce 
automotive catalytic converters. This is the a CCIG’s justification for approaching the 
Department of the Mineral Resources for state support to the catalytic converter 
industry which has struggled to recover since the dti’s removal of state support for 
automotive component producers33. In addition, some component producers have 
gone beyond the automotive sector associations to secure their interest, especially 
smaller and diversified producers who could not afford the wage determined through 
the Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council (MEIBC)34.  
 
Given this pluralism in the way component producers articulate and lobby for their 
interest, the gains have accrued unequally in favour of component groups with the 
strongest voice. Nevertheless, when compared to OEMs, component producers have 
much less bargaining power. Hence component producers have less influence on 
industrial policy and capture less state support. 
 
Labour 
Labour influences policy at various levels. NUMSA has direct influence on the 
automotive sector’s industrial policy, as the major trade union in the sector 
representing labour interests on key platforms such as the MIDC and MIDC Monitoring 
Committee. Trade unions bargain for wages through the Motor Industry Bargaining 
Council (MIBCO) and MEIBC. Through MIBCO the industry sets wages for the 
automotive sector triennially and working conditions are bargained for at individual 
firm-level35.   
 
The interviews reveal that the labour lobby has had moderate successes and continues 
to face challenges due to the dynamic and competitive nature of the automotive 
                                              
Paid Electricity Meters; SMART Meters; Working Vessels/Boats. See the dti, n.d. “Industrial Procurement”. Department of Trade 
and Industry: Pretoria. 
33 See Venter, 2014. 
34 See SEIFSA, 2014a. “48 Hours’ Notice of Lock-Out Action”, Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of Southern Africa. 26 
June 2014. 
35 Interviews with: NUMSA, 31 October 2014, Johannesburg; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
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sector. Labour has succeeded in influencing policy design to take localisation as an 
important policy objective36. This serves the interest of labour because ensuring, and 
increasing localisation, would result on more job-creation. However, labour has not 
been able to influence policy to the extent that the state makes a specific job-related 
obligations or requirements to accessing state support or incentives.  
 
Labour is mostly organised in the OEMs and large component producers. There is little 
unionisation in small component producers, and the majority of labour working in 
automotive component production is not unionised37.  The automotive sector’s 
diversity with regards to the how it is located within current sector classifications and 
state organisation also undermines the influence of labour in many key components. 
For example, the automotive sector demands: leather for vehicle trim which is classified 
under agricultural products and affected by policies administered through the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; steel products for vehicle bodies 
and parts which are classified under primary or manufactured products and affected 
by policies administered by the dti and the Department of Mineral Resources.  
Bargaining for wages in the components industry is also complicated by fractured 
representation of the components producers because some are in the MIBCO, whilst 
some are in Retail Motor Industry Organisation and the MEIBC38. As a result even when 
labour has achieved a favourable wage bargain through MIBCO those benefits do not 
accrue to all labour working in the automotive sector which undermines the organising 
ability and influence of labour on industrial policy.  
 
In addition loose policy design and inimical corporate strategy also undermine the 
quality of jobs created.  This is an inadvertent result of the state’s attempt to secure 
jobs through conditional added state support if firms maintain their current 
employment levels, for an undefined period of time, which has encouraged labour 
brokering and casualisation of labour39. Because government incentives to the 
                                              
36 Interview with NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
37 Interview with NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. Majority of OEM employees are NUMSA members, making NUMSA 
an important stakeholder in the automotive sector. However, the same is not true with the component production firms due to 
the segmented nature of automotive component production which results in some producers being classified under different 
economic sectors.  
38 Interview with NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
39 Interview with NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. Firms can apply for government subsidy to the value of 20% of the 
investment value under the AIS. The only requirement for a firm to increase the incentive above 20% is retaining employment. 
However there is no specification of the kind of employment to be retained. In OEMs, where NUMSA has most of its bargaining 
power due to high unionisation of labour,  there has been no labour brokering because there is coordination of labour unions at 
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automotive industry do not stipulate the kinds of jobs to be retained in order to access 
greater state support; corporate strategy to access greater value from incentives has 
resulted labour brokering and casualisation of labour. This also undermines the 
interest of labour by establishing worse working conditions and lower wages. 
 
Lastly, labour also influences industrial policy and corporate strategy through industrial 
action and strikes. In July 2014 there was a seven-week strike at metals and engineering 
firms which resulted in job-losses and lockouts after NUMSA made an agreement with 
employers in the MEIBC40. Industrial action and strikes are often a last resort due to 
contradictory outcomes such as higher wages and job-losses. The Labour Relations 
Act now also requires compulsory balloting before a strike and now allows the state 
to force parties into arbitration41. Hence labour has achieved only moderate successes 
and continues to face challenges due to the dynamic and competitive nature of the 
automotive sector. 
 
Discussion 
Institutions defining social relations 
The vast interest and continually growing space for pluralistic interest articulation in 
the form of vulnerable and unique products like catalytic converters, valves and tyres 
increases the tendency towards competitive rather than cooperative interactions 
between the various stakeholders. In addition, the pluralistic articulation of interest 
undermines the prospects of the collaborative approach to industrial policy. And 
asymmetric bargaining power which results from firm size and influence within the 
collaborative policy-making platforms further increases competition for having the 
“definitive voice”. Therefore, although the state tries to establish a coordinated 
industrial policy framework, internal competition amongst and within stakeholders for 
a definitive voice diminishes the potential for successful coordination. And where 
coordination is achieved the gains are unequally shared because of the power 
                                              
the international level as well due to the multinational nature of automotive production. But in components where NUMSA has 
limited bargaining power, NUMSA has not been able to curb labour brokering.  
40 See NUMSA, 2014. “Notice of Strike on Wage Issues and Other Substantive Issues”, National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa. 25 June 2014; SEIFSA, 2014a; Gernetzky & Furlonger, 2014. “NUMSA Told Job Losses Probably Unavoidable in Pay Deal”, 
Business Day Live. 24 July 2014. 
41 Interview with NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
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imbalance amongst stakeholders. In order for the state to resolve this, the state needs 
to develop non-economic institutions which require a certain level of shared 
knowledge, collaboration and credible commitments between stakeholders. 
 
The social relations amongst the different stakeholders are not driven by CME-type 
social relations and institutional functions, instead the relations amongst stakeholders 
are competitive. Institutions function to improve competitiveness and movement of 
inputs. This is due to the strong state support for LME-type institutions in terms of 
implementing widespread liberalisation. South Africa’s trade liberalisation was based 
on the premise that increased competition from imports would be an impetus for 
improved efficiency which would result in higher exports from domestic producers of 
competing goods42. Even though the structures for collaboration like the MIDC exist, 
the fact that the state has supported institutions that encourage competitive social 
relations undermines the objectives of industrial policy. Because the state has 
supported LME-type institutions instead of CME-type institutions such as collaboration 
and cooperation. This is the source of the policy incoherence problem highlighted in 
Chapter 2. 
 
The state has given strong support to LME-type institutions which are administered 
through compulsory formal and informal rules associated with the tariff regime, the 
system of import-export complementation and competitiveness targeting policies. In 
addition the state has inadequately supported CME-type institutions. The only policies 
supporting collaboration amongst firms are clustering and special economic zones 
(SEZs) – which are transversal policy interventions with voluntary participation. This 
why some firms feel that, although they have gained from participation in clustering 
at the Durban Auto Cluster and the Auto Industry Development Centre, their best 
benefit has been low rent costs at clustering facilities43. This undermined collaboration 
and inter-firm relations became more competitively-driven. This developed as a result 
of formal and informal rules “institutions” or policy adopted by the state.  
                                              
42 Interviews with: the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton; Manufacturing Circle, 18 August 2014, Johannesburg; NAAMSA, 29 September 
2014, Centurion. 
43 Interview with Ramsay Engineering, 15 October 2014, Midrand. It may be argued that the firm may have reach its peak 
competitiveness or close to its level of diminishing or constant returns to clustering as it were. However, given the primary aim of 
these SEZs, this case either shows a failure to achieve the full aims of clustering or that the programmes have inadequate means 
of selecting firms that would benefit the most. If this is the case there needs to be a stronger effort to improve state support for 
SEZs and CME-type institutions more generally. On the other hand, perhaps firms have chosen to participate as way to reducing 
their costs thereby improving cost competitiveness. This would not be the case without state support of LME-type institutions. 
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Table 4: Summary Comparison of Institutional Structures 
 LME CME SA Auto Sector 
Social 
relations 
Competitive 
market 
relations 
Non-market 
relations 
Competitive, price and cost-
efficiency-driven social relation. 
Equilibrium Demand, 
supply and 
hierarchy 
Strategic interaction 
amongst firms and 
other actors 
Demand, supply and hierarchy 
(e.g. market share). 
Inter-firm 
relations 
Competitive Collaboration and 
cooperation 
Limited collaboration through 
cluster; GVC relations with some 
vertical integration, responsive 
suppliers and captive follower 
firms44. 
Institutional 
functions 
Competitiven
ess, greater 
fluidity of 
inputs 
Monitoring and 
retribution for 
defectors 
Competitiveness driven, focused 
on cost competitiveness and 
some expertise. 
Employment General skills, 
short-term, 
fluid 
Specific skills, long-
term, immobile 
General with focus on technical 
skills, more labour fluidity within 
components segment45. 
Wage 
bargaining 
Firm-level Industry-level Industry-level but strong 
lobbying for firm-level 
bargaining within components 
segment46. 
Policies Deregulation, 
anti-trust 
laws, tax-
breaks 
Encourages 
information sharing 
and collaboration of 
firms 
Liberalisation (trade 
deregulation), duty rebates (trade 
“tax-break”), investment 
subsidies. 
(Source: Hall & Gingerich, 2004, pp. 32-33; Kang, 2006, pp. 8-11; Fieldwork interviews with various 
stakeholders) 
Although it is defensible to argue that it is the competitive nature of the global 
automotive production industry which makes firms more market-orientated; this is not 
entirely true. Firstly, the extent to which the state liberalised by reducing its applied 
tariff rates was unnecessary. Even though it has been argued that South Africa has 
various powers which it cannot exercise given that it acceded to World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) membership as a developed country due to sunset clauses during 
the transition from Apartheid to democracy. Empirical research shows that the state 
went beyond the required stipulations of the WTO and still has policy space to protect 
                                              
44  Interviews with all component producers show that all component producers supply “build-to-print” components to OEMs 
whilst Benteler South Africa is a subsidiary of Benteler AG which is a captive worldwide supplier of catalytic converters for General 
Motors Company. 
45 Interviews with: NUMSA, 31 October 2014, Johannesburg; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg; Mr Kakaza, MBSA: 
Robotics Support Technician, 18 December 2014, East London. 
46 See SEIFSA, 2014b. “Press Release - 2014/07/22: SEIFSA Accepts Minister's Proposal on Wages but Not on Section 37”, Steel 
and Engineering Industries Federation of Southern Africa, 22 July 2014 
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local industry through higher tariffs without contravening WTO requirements47. 
Secondly without this policy decision by the state, the exposure to global competition 
would have been much less therefore there would be less incentive for competitive 
relations amongst firms; if it is indeed true that the nature of the global automotive 
industry incentivises competitive inter-firm relations.  
 
Therefore this study argues that it is the institutions that the state chose to support 
which determined the relations amongst firms rather than the inherent nature of the 
globally integrated automotive sector. As we shall discover in relation to the 
institutions arising from the incentive structure of industrial policy, the support for 
LME-type institutions incentivised the growth in export despite little deepening and 
growth of local value-addition and the persistent trade deficit. This is the institutional 
basis for the policy coherence problem48, which shows a fundamental 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the types of institutions required to fulfil the 
industrial policy objectives. This institutional incoherence manifested itself as the type 
of policy tools utilised and the inimical incentives and outcomes which resulted from 
poor coordination of private economic interest to achieve the national interest of job-
creation. 
 
Institutions arising from the incentives that individuals respond to  
As things stand, South Africa’s industrial policy subsidises the cost of capital strongly. 
Many incentivises are aimed at subsidising the cost of capital equipment and 
machinery for firms. For instance, the AIS provides up to 30% cash grants for qualifying 
capital investments49. Most incentives, especially in the automotive sector, support 
capital-intensity because the state subsidises the cost of capital as opposed to labour. 
National incentive programmes are primarily aimed at the firm-level and geared 
towards capital equipment subsidisation with only a few incentives aim at labour 
                                              
47 Interview with B&M Analysts, 25 September 2014, Skype™. Sandrey (2013: p. 16) found that all the special designation motor 
vehicles and parts under chapter 98 and 64.8% of tariff lines unders chapter 87 have an average policy space of 9.7% which means 
their applied tariff rate is on average 9.7% below the WTO-required bound rates. 
48 The policy coherence problem point to the issue that South Africa's liberalisation was premature given the global 
competitiveness of local production. And secondly that the system of import-export complementation undermined the 
development of local component producers by making it easier for firms to reach duty neutrality which incentivised greater 
imports. Thus state policy was incoherent with the intended purpose which was to develop the local industry, raise exports and 
bring about rationalisation because it increased pressure from imports too rapidly and excessively reduced the price preference 
towards locally-sourced components (see Barnes, 2013, pp. 3, 34). 
49 Interview with the dti, 5 December 201, Pretoria. See the dti, 2013b, p. 39.  
52 
 
 
subsidisation or skills development (Figure 8 below). This is the first policy incoherence 
that is a structural obstacle to job-creation. Firstly, this promotes mechanisation 
resulting in less labour demand. Secondly, if poorly managed this may result in excess 
demand for skilled labour or a structural skills mismatch if the labour market has 
mostly unskilled labour as is the case in South Africa. 
 
Figure 8: Matrix of National Industrial Policy Incentives 
 
(Author’s Depiction, Source: Various Interviews50) 
 
In conventional economic theory, the number of inputs considered is limited to labour, 
capital and technology. The adoption of new technology, which requires more capital, 
allows firms to improve the quality and quantity of their output if that the new 
technology is efficiently utilised. There are various policy implications here because on 
the one hand the state has stated its industrial policy focus as employment growth 
whilst it has chosen incentives that subsidise the cost of capital, thereby encouraging 
capital-intensity over labour-intensive production. Whilst this may improve 
productivity in the automotive sector – this has a trade-off for the number of workers 
                                              
50 Interviews with: Manufacturing Circle, 18 August 2014, Johannesburg; B&M Analysts (Pty) Ltd/ University of KwaZulu Natal, 25 
September 2014, Skype™; NUMSA, 31 October 2014, Johannesburg; the dti, 5 Decemeber 2014, Pretoria. 
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employed, as new technology may include machinery that increases output whilst 
requiring fewer workers to operate. For example, despite the more than 200% increase 
in production, the automotive sector has shed over 20 000 jobs and employment levels 
declined by a nett of 25% since 1995 (see Figure 1 above). This fundamental economic 
mechanism highlights the policy incoherence arising from the institutional 
incoherence.  
 
In addition to capital subsidies, the MIDP supported export growth. The MIDP was 
intended to integrate the local industry into the global economy, improve 
competitiveness of the local industry, and reverse the proliferation of models in the 
economy51. To deal with the problem of rationalisation and competitiveness the state 
used a system of IRCCs to promote exports and allow OEMs to import components for 
their low volume models produced locally. But to export, the firms need to be close to 
the GVCs. Many locally-owned firms, some of which went through divestment during 
the 1980s, had to sell-off large stakes to foreign parent companies because global 
OEMs wanted closer ownership over the intellectual property and other aspects of 
production52.   
 
Trade liberalisation and exposure to competition from imports did not incentivise 
rationalisation as had been hoped because the liberalisation did not lead to a 
coordinated increase in localisation of the components used for the high-volume 
models produced locally. Instead some local firms sold out to OEMs and foreign 
component producers53. Moreover, the IRCCs did not incentivise localisation because 
it made it too easy for firms to reach duty neutrality54. In addition, the IRCCs and 
liberalisation policies incentivised exporting highly-priced low-value-added exports to 
earn the highest import duty value so as to pay for high value-added imports. This was 
done as a way to increase rents and also more easily finance imports for production. 
 
                                              
51 Interviews with: the dti, 5 December 2014, Pretoria; TSAM, 23 October 2014, Prospecton; NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, 
Centurion. Also see Barnes, 2013. 
52 Interviews with: the dti, 5 December 2014, Pretoria; TSAM, 23 October 2014, Prospecton; NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, 
Centurion. Also see Barnes, 2013. 
53 Interview with Aunde Tap, 20 October 2014, Durban. 
54 Interview with B&M Analysts (Pty) Ltd/ University of KwaZulu Natal, 25 September 2014, Skype™. Also see Barnes & Kaplinsky, 
2000; Kaplinsky, 2000; Barnes & Black, 2013. 
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As a result there was a rapid growth in local catalytic converter production because 
catalytic converts are highly-priced due to their platinum content instead of their local 
value-added. After 1995, catalytic converters rapidly grew as a form of exported local 
content because they have a very high export value which meant that firms could claim 
high import duty rebates (Figure 10 below). The catalytic converter industry was 
completely export focused and closely linked to OEMs as component. The system of 
IRCCs was very lucrative for component producers because, apart from the import duty 
rebate benefits, they also sold the IRCCs to other firms in the sector, including OEMs55. 
However, following research by Black and Barnes, the dti applied for a phasing down 
of the eligible rebate value of IRCCs to incentivise localisation of higher value-added 
components. But the state failed to coordinate OEMs’ behaviour around this outcome. 
Instead OEMs acted as lead firms by either establishing in-house production of 
catalytic converters or acquiring external diversified catalytic converters producers and 
logistic to export catalytic converters for them globally. 
 
Figure 9: Automotive Sector’s Impact on Balance of Payment (US$, 1989-2014) 
 
(Author’s Calculations, Data Source: Quantec) 
                                              
55 Interview with NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
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One example of full integration is Toyota Tsusho Africa in the case of TSAM; whilst 
Benteler South Africa is an example of a captive follower firm that exports catalytic 
converters worldwide for General Motors Company. Benteler South Africa also exports 
some loose components for engine and exhaust systems, but this is negligible in 
comparison to its catalytic converter exports56. Investment in catalytic converters does 
not support employment growth because the production of catalytic converters is 
capital intensive and has little local value-added. In the current APDP period there have 
been various calls for greater support and concern from the catalytic industry that it 
cannot survive without state support57. Thus, instead of incentivising increased 
investment in specific productive activities like the development of other local 
productive capacities, the state has incentivised unsustainable and short-term focused 
investment in some components to capture rents from the state because the state 
supported LME-type institutions through its industrial policy. 
 
Figure 10: Sample Component Exports (Relative Share in US$, 1994-2014) 
 
(Author’s Calculations, Data Source: Quantec) 
 
                                              
56 Interview with Benteler South Africa, 15 October 2014, Midrand. 
57 Interview with Benteler South Africa, 15 October 2014, Midrand. Also see Venter, 2014; Dewar, 2012, p. 898. 
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Other industries in specific activities like raw skin and hides industry which is 
considerably more labour-intensive than catalytic converter production, have 
contracted significantly as auto firms moved their assets towards activities with higher 
returns like catalytic converter production (Figure 10 above). This is consistent with 
firms’ responses in the context of institutional support for LMEs. In addition, with the 
transition from the MIDP to the APDP, the state brought on changes aimed at resolving 
part of this problem.  But many foreign component producers were led to divest as a 
result of the vertical integration of some local components production and the growth 
in OEM influence due to policies and institutional support which favours OEMs. The 
remaining component producers had to adjust their strategy from being export-
focused towards supplying OEMs58. 
 
The state has not established ways of developing strategic relations between OEMs 
and component producers. Most of the state interventions are often geared at 
individual firm efficiency improvements through plural forms of state support. For 
example, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research’s Technology Assistance 
Programme offers skills development, operational efficiency and investment assistance 
to firms. Whilst the Manufacturing, Engineering and Related Sector Education and 
Training Authority offers technical training and skills development programmes. 
However, these interventions are not aimed at developing strategic relations between 
OEMs and component producers; as a result these relations are still predominantly 
market-orientated.  
 
The implications of LME-type institutional support in the automotive sector is that 
relations between OEMs and component producers remain market-orientated; forcing 
the sector into an obsession with price. NUMSA’s view, which is partly true, is that 
competitiveness remains a major challenge for the sector because remedies focus only 
on labour cost competitiveness which ignores other factors reducing competitiveness 
such as cooperative industrial relations and skills deficits59. Therefore, despite the 
broad support programmes offered by the state, competitiveness is still just about cost 
                                              
58 Interviews with: Manufacturing Circle, 18 August 2014, Johannesburg; Aunde Tap, 20 October 2014, Durban. 
59 Interview with NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. 
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effectiveness or beating your competitor’s price. As aptly described by Mr Deshan 
Naidoo who is the Marketing and Strategy Manager at Microfinish: 
“When it comes to this sector, it’s all about price. If something is cheaper overseas, it 
will be imported. People only buy locally if it makes economic sense.”60 
 
The implication of this is that local component producers continue playing “catch up” 
to external demands on quality, delivery and price from OEMs. And collaboration is 
minimised, and when it does occur it is market-driven rather than being driven by 
strategic cooperation. For example TSAM has a monthly performance management 
system in place along with a cross-functional team that gets involved in helping its 
suppliers depending on the area of failure which often includes cost, quality, 
sustainable delivery and technical capacity61. These type of supplier-development 
systems are however aimed at minimising supply interruptions at OEMs rather than 
developing the local industry.  
 
Nonetheless, the benefits of this system are amongst the greatest benefit that the state 
wants to accrue to local component producers, which justifies administering incentives 
through OEMs. But this exclusively focused on component producers supplying local 
OEMs. Yet there are many component firms that supply the aftermarket and OEMs 
abroad instead of local OEMs62 which shows international competitiveness of some of 
the local component producers that are not supplying local OEMs. Thus there are some 
component producers that could possibly be relatively more competitive than those 
supplying local OEMs, who could show greater return for state incentives aimed at 
promoting rationalisation, but the state has completely abandoned them given its 
implementation of industrial policy. This also undermines the common assertion that 
limited investment in local higher value-added component production is due to local 
producers being uncompetitive and not meeting global standards and consumer 
demands. 
 
In terms of investment and returns in terms of jobs, it makes sense why the state would 
support OEMs but in terms of the aftermarket the state should support component 
                                              
60 Interview with Microfinish, 15 October 2014, Midrand. 
61 Interview with TSAM, 10 November 2014, Conference Call. 
62 Interviews: Microfinish, 15 October 2014, Midrand; Aunde Tap, 20 October 2014, Durban. 
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producers. Moreover, the state should also focus on supporting those local component 
producers that are exporting to foreign OEMs as well since they have already proven 
to be competitive by the common benchmark of supplying OEMs. But the state has no 
support for the aftermarket and, under the APDP, state support for component 
producers is limited to those supplying the seven local OEMs.  
 
In addition, because the state had not differentiated component producers according 
to labour-intensity of their production process, the state was not able to prioritise 
component industries which would create the greatest local value-added and jobs. As 
a result of the undifferentiated approach to applying incentives to component 
producers, OEMs and multinational component producers were able to undermine 
industrial policy objective as discussed above.  
 
On the other hand, the state has not intervened in critical areas like power relations 
between OEMs and component producers in order to resolve power-related issues 
undermining the development of local component producers. Some of these include: 
the downward pressure on component producers’ supply prices by OEMs which 
require annual reduction in the price of components from local suppliers, delays and 
non-payment of local component producers by local OEMs, bureaucratic red-tape 
associated with supplying OEMs, and the passing of wage increases onto component 
producers through OEMs ‘revisiting’ supplier contracts63. 
 
Institutions arising from organisational hierarchical hegemony 
Developments in the global economy and the integration of South Africa’s automotive 
sector occurred in a way that empowered OEMs. The rising dominance of GVCs meant 
that OEMs could assume the position of lead firms which placed them in a strategic 
position to determine the direction of development for follower component producing 
firms. And because exporting required closeness to GVCs, local component producers 
were automatically integrated as follower firms. In addition, the position of OEMs 
within the GVC allowed them a privileged position in terms of access to global and 
domestic quantitative data on the sector because of the business processes of bidding 
                                              
63 Interviews with: Microfinish, 15 October 2014, Midrand; Aunde Tap, 20 October 2014, Durban; C&J Services, 23 October 2014, 
Durban; NUMSA, 31 October 2014, Johannesburg. 
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for OEM-supplier projects. This meant that OEMs could bid down the price of its 
suppliers by reviewing contracts and demanding annual supplier price decreases. And 
this allowed OEMs to use “domestic competitiveness” as a reason for sourcing 
imported components64.  
 
Firstly, OEMs dominate through their hierarchical position in the automotive sector 
GVCs. As lead firms, OEMs dictate the process of industrial development based on the 
demands they place on follower firms that are part of their GVC. By tying in local 
component producers into OEM GVCs through the industrial policy, the state is 
subjugating the industrial development process of technological upgrading and 
growth of local firms to that of OEMs. This is evidenced by the fact that local OEM 
sourcing decisions are made by their foreign parent companies based on the retail 
price of the car and where it is exported with less interest in the health of local 
subsidiary assemblers, let alone local component producers65. In addition OEMs are 
also in a strategic position to bid down the price of components, thereby partially 
determining the possible profit margins for OEM-supplying component producers. 
Interviews with different component producers testify to the well-research fact that 
profit margins have always been higher in the aftermarket66. 
 
The implications of this is that industrial policy will not be able to deal with any issues 
of rationalisation directly because the production of local component firms will be 
dictated by OEM demands. And as mentioned in Chapter 3, local component 
producers would upgrade by acquiring the ability to supply local OEMs, however this 
has natural limitations given the level of domestic vehicle manufacturing. The 
development of follower firms depends on their integration into lead firms’ GVCs. Thus 
the state had implemented a critical change under the APDP in that only OEMs can 
apply for state support claims.  
 
According to the dti this makes practical sense given that the state cannot administer 
incentives to over 500 producers who could potentially claim under the APDP67. This 
                                              
64 Interviews with: C&J Services, 23 October 2014, Durban; NUMSA, 31 October 2014, Johannesburg. 
65 Interviews with: NAAMSA, 29 September 2014, Centurion; TSAM, 23 October 2014, Prospecton; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, 
Johannesburg. 
66 Interviews with: Microfinish, 15 October 2014, Midrand; C&J Services, 23 October 2014, Durban. Also see Board of Trade and 
Industries, 1981, pp. 17-19;  
67 Interview with dti, 5 December 2014, Pretoria. 
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may be true given that the Automotive Sector Chief Directorate within the dti has 9 
employees, two of which are administrators (Team Assistant and a Personal Assistant) 
with the remaining 7 being direct line responsibilities (i.e. a Chief Director, a Deputy 
Chief Director, three Directors, and two Assistant Directors)68. In addition there are 3 
other people within the Industrial Development Incentive Administration Division who 
are in-charge of administering the AIS which includes receiving applications, providing 
information on rules, and disbursing funds etc.69.  And even with the consolidation of 
the APDP through OEMs, firms still feel that processing of applications is still slow and 
overly bureaucratic70 so even if the dti Automotive Sector Chief Directorate were to 
build capacity by increasing its employees, it would still not be able to establish the 
capacity needed. 
 
Although the APDP administration choice is understood as a practical choice due to 
limitations in state capacity, this policy choice is also attractive for the state if it seeks 
to coordinate automotive firms through OEMs. So instead of having to coordinate 
plural interests, the coordination problem is reduced by mediating coordination 
through OEMs. In addition, given the GVC structure of the automotive sector, OEMs 
have experience in coordinating various firms or vastly distant operations. As such the 
APDP policy choice is doubly attractive because of its practicality and efficiency.  And 
since OEMs are making claims based on local value-added associated with their 
locally-sourced components, local producers that are not exporting do not claim for 
any APDP incentives. So now under the APDP, OEMs claim based on local value added 
from their sourcing strategy which guarantees a market for local component producers 
supplying OEMs. But given the dominant position of OEMs and their historically 
established behaviour as lead firms, this guarantee may be challenged. 
 
The practical choice of the state to administer industrial policy through OEMs further 
entrenches this structural imbalance through economic institutions of state support. 
Already, the state finds itself having to offer concessions to the industrial policy 
requirement to produce 50 000 vehicles per annum, for some OEMs. This further 
                                              
68 Interview with dti, 5 December 2014, Pretoria. 
69 Interview with dti, 5 December 2014, Pretoria. 
70 Interviews with: Ramsay Engineering, 15 October 2014, Midrand; Benteler South Africa, 15 October 2014, Midrand; Aunde Tap, 
20 October 2014, Durban. 
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entrenches the challenges associated with rationalisation and maintains inefficiencies 
through state support. And by administering the APDP in this way, under an LME 
institutional support established during the MIDP, the state is at high risk of its 
industrial policy being deteriorated through international sourcing. But since OEMs 
claim incentives based on components sourced locally, this challenge is partially 
resolved. However, this does not resolve the long-standing challenge of the 
automotive sector trade deficit unless there are policy provisions that require 
progressively higher levels of local content.  
 
However, a major weakness of the APDP is that it does not require local content. 
According to the dti this is due to the position of South Africa in the global political 
environment. South Africa could not go in the direction of some other emerging 
countries like Brazil which has many disputes against it for contravening WTO rules in 
favour of local development policy. However, this has already been discredited by the 
tariff policy space available and the availability of other protective measures like non-
tariff barriers which are not currently used in the automotive industrial policy71.  Thus 
there is an asymmetry in bargaining power in favour of OEMs over local component 
producers because of the GVC arrangement of the automotive sector, the social 
relations, and inter-firm relations associated with GVCs. This implies that there is 
negligible sharing of information, which is the missing key institution required by the 
CME-based industrial policy structure. 
 
Secondly, OEMs are dominant as a result of asymmetric information between the 
OEMs and component producers, and between the state and automotive firms. There 
is asymmetric access to quantitative firm-level data, which is only shared with the state 
by firms when they are applying for tariff protection or industrial policy programmes 
(ITAC, n.d.). This creates a challenge for the state because its industrial policy responses 
are based only on aggregated sector data. The Automotive Sector Chief Directorate at 
the dti only has access to NAAMSA-provided disaggregated OEM production data, 
and relies on the Automotive Export Manual which is also produced from 
disaggregated components production data provided by NAAMSA-affiliates72. Firm-
                                              
71 Interview with NUMSA, 31 October 2014, Johannesburg. 
72 Requests for data from NAACAM and the dti yielded recommendations to aggregated data sourced from NAAMSA. Moreover, 
this data is only available from 2008 onwards. 
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level data analysis is rare in South African industrial policy, this is often limited to single 
or small groups of firms who are applying for the revision of tariff through ITAC. 
Generally industrial policy is not guided by rigorous firm-level data analysis as the dti 
and other state agencies and departments do not have sector-wide firm-level data. 
The implication of this is that policy-making is practically not sensitive to more 
nuanced adverse economic outcomes of industrial policy. Moreover, the state is unable 
to see the source of income for automotive firms in order to support economic growth 
that is consistent with the national interest of job-creation. 
 
In addition to the bargaining power derived from OEMs’ GVC position, this 
informational asymmetry has political implications which benefit OEMs and 
component producers unequally whilst disadvantaging the state. OEMs’ bidding 
processes for component suppliers to their various models places OEMs in a strategic 
position to bid their costs down. But this is also constrained by considerations about 
quality and supplier performance. Therefore OEMs have a very privileged position in 
the automotive value-chain on two accounts. OEMs are at the helm of a sector 
reporting structure with informational asymmetry as members and office-bearers of 
NAAMSA, which provides limited disaggregated data to both the state and scholars 
researching the sector. This bolsters the strategic position of OEMs allowing them to 
influence more than just the price of inputs. And administering the APDP through 
OEMs reinforces the strategic position of OEMs with respect to their access to 
information and bargaining power within the automotive value-chain. 
 
Moreover, the strategic placement of key OEM personnel in various structures also 
increases their access to information. For example, TSAM has representatives on the 
OEM Council, regional clusters and ASCCI with the main aim of influencing the market 
at a strategic level73. The implication of all this is that OEMs will grow their influence 
to the point that industrial policy is needed indefinitely because OEMs will have the 
voice to lobby for it regardless of the implications on economic efficiency. And given 
that the state tries to maintain CME-type social structures for policy-making, which 
requires shared knowledge and collective learning, the asymmetry of information 
sustained through the current administration of the APDP will further entrench 
                                              
73 Interview with TSAM, 10 November 2014, Conference Call. 
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pluralism as opposed to corporatist interest articulation. Thus OEMs will continue 
having a critical advantage in the bargaining process which follows from their position 
in the automotive GVC and informational asymmetry that benefits OEMs. 
 
Informational asymmetry is a major challenge for the state and its process of industrial 
policy-making. South Africa has a small share of global motor vehicle production, and 
since the OEMs are multinational corporations that can meet their production demand 
needs with other competitor markets like Thailand and Brazil, the threat of relocation 
is a real possibility. Moreover, the complete withdrawal of OEMs in Australia, despite 
concerted state support, which informed the South African automotive industrial 
policy further confirmed the credibility of this threat to the South African state74. This 
explains the progressive skewing of industrial policy parameters to increasingly benefit 
OEMs over time. The impact of this informational asymmetry is that it justifies the 
perceived threat of relocation by OEMs. Through lobbying or strategic use of economic 
rhetoric mixed with “expert advice” on how to develop and administer industrial policy, 
OEMs have succeed in influencing industrial to serves the interest of OEMs above 
national interest. For instance, through strategic lobbying, OEMs were able to influence 
implementation and final parameters of the APDP from being skewed to favour 
components to being strongly in their favour by persuading the minister to reject the 
initial APDP policy suggestions by private consultants75. 
 
Thus there is a need to balance the power of OEMs by legislating a certain model of 
reporting about the industry which must require all automotive industry firms to 
submit data to a central state agency. This is necessary because of the complex system 
of administering the APDP which makes it complicated for the state to consolidate all 
its industry data because the administration is spread across different departments. 
For example, information on the quantum of incentive each OEM has received over 
the past years is close to impossible to collate because the dti administers the AIS, 
ITAC administers the Vehicle Assembly Allowance, and SARS administers the IRCCs 
etc76. Therefore getting information on the incentive programmes involves accessing 
one agency of the National Treasury and a parliamentary body. Collating this 
                                              
74 Interview with dti, 5 December 2014, Pretoria. 
75 Interview with B&M Analysts, 25 September 2014, Skype™; NUMSA, 31 October 2014, Johannesburg. 
76 Email correspondence with Ms Gugu Nkosi, dti: Deputy Director – Auto Sector, 8 February 2015. 
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information would involve a myriad of approvals and it is likely that the information is 
confidential which would further complicate the process. Moreover, because many 
state departments and agencies are decentralised, the state does not know the full 
quantum of incentives the firms have received from the state which increases the risk 
of “double-dipping” and inefficient use of state resources.  
 
Why has there been no differentiation between components? 
The foregone analysis explains why the automotive sector has supported growth in 
terms of exports, despite a reliance on imports, but not supported employment. This 
is explained through analysis of key findings from interviews and secondary research 
on the institutions defining the political economy of industrial policy. The foregone 
analysis reveals that, due to both the policy measures and the institutional context, 
implementation of the automotive sector industrial policy has not been oriented 
towards more labour-absorbing activities. Especially in the impact on local 
components manufacturing industry. Although this explains why component 
producers were not the focus of industrial policy; this does not fully explain why the 
state has not differentiated between components based on their impact on 
employment before providing state support.  
 
This study argues that the state did not differentiate in favour of relatively more labour-
intensive components because of the power and influence of interests over the policies 
and the resulting institutional factors of policy-making and implementation. The 
asymmetry of information does not only affect the bargaining power of OEMs and the 
state as discussed above. Asymmetric information also affects state capacity and the 
interventions chosen by the state. As already discussed, the strategic position of OEMs 
in terms of their access to industry information through their bidding process and 
control of NAAMSA which provides the state with data on the industry presents a 
challenge to industrial policy.  
 
One of the most critical effects of the informational asymmetry is that policy-makers 
believe the threat of relocation by OEMs is credible despite the scant evidence that is 
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used to justify the threat77. Given that the state only has access to highly aggregated 
data and the fact that OEMs would have only provided firm-level data on subsidiaries 
if they ever submitted tariff requests to ITAC; the state does not have full information 
about the current financial and productive status of OEMs beyond publicly 
disseminated financial reports. And the focus of information used to track the 
performance of the sector focuses on output only. Critical firm-level data like the 
current profit rates and capital amortisation rates is not accessible to the state and 
seldom forms part of policy-making78. It might very well be that OEMs are overly 
invested and the cost of amortising capital might be too high to divest from South 
Africa and the stat would not know such information79. Yet the state takes the threat 
of relocation as being credible despite the lack of evidence. This impact the perceived 
policy space and the development industrial policy.  
 
Secondly, this informational asymmetry has impacted the state’s ability to design and 
implement industrial policy. The fact the IRCCs ended up costing the state too much 
is evidence that industrial policy design was not guided by clear evidence. Without 
speculating about the accuracy of information that NAAMSA provides through its 
monthly reports and data services that the state subscribes to for data on the sector80, 
one can unpack the impact of the informational asymmetry with regards to monitoring 
sector performance. The state has limited access to data on the sector and most 
proprietary reports from NAAMSA and AIEC provide highly aggregated data on the 
components industry.  
 
Lastly, the informational asymmetry put the state at risk of selective use of economic 
evidence mixed with “expert advice” on how to develop and administer industrial 
policy in a way that serves the interest of OEMs above national interest.  Hence, the 
                                              
77 Interview with the dti, 14 August 2014, Sandton. Because the South African automotive industrial policy is modelled on the 
Australian Button Plan, developments there have always alerted policymakers about the imminent dangers they might face even 
though the perceived threats have not manifest. Part of the justification to remove subsidies to local component producers in 
South Africa was the case against Australia’s subsidies for automotive leather producers. The subsequent announcement that all 
OEMs in Australia would relocate by 2017 due to failure of the Button Plan is further “evidence” justifying the threat of relocation. 
Also see the dti, 2014, p. 87. 
78 Requests for data from NAAMSA and the dti yielded recommendations to aggregated data sourced from NAAMSA reports. 
Moreover, this data is only available from 2008 onwards. And the only data source provided by NAACAM was the annual AIEC 
report which only details components to the level of component groups as displayed in Tables 1 and 2 above. 
79 This was the case in Phase V of the LCPs. Due to high capital equipment requirements firms could not exit the market because 
they were overly invested and had high sunk costs (Dix, 1995, p. 34). 
80 The dti Auto Sector Desk subscribes to Lightstone Auto for more disaggregated data on OEM vehicle sales. Beyond that the 
state relies on highly aggregated data from the AIEC and NAACAM annual reports for the components industry. 
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informational asymmetry limited policy space perceived by policy-makers affecting the 
state’s bargaining power and ability to design and implement industrial policy. This 
study argues that the informational asymmetry affected the state’s political and 
administrative capacity to monitor, evaluate and enforce industrial policy – which is 
why the state did take a differentiated approach to the components industry. In 
addition, OEM lobbying and institutional aspects of industrial policy-making also 
reinforced the interest of OEMs over local component producers. 
 
The result has been an investment support strategy that is aimed at OEMs and 
secondarily at component producer. The state’s perspective is to support OEMs 
through supply-side interventions with the hope that the OEMs will create the 
domestic demand required to develop local component producers. Reliance on GVC 
structures for coordination has also led the state to coordinate incentives aimed at 
component producers through OEMs. Therefore, there has not been any 
differentiation in support offered to components producers is because the state lacked 
detailed dynamic information on the sector; especially the components industry. 
Moreover, lack of evidence underpinning policy and resource constraints have limited 
the ability of the state to intervene and support local component producers.  
 
This is why establishing an additional stream of industry data through a central 
database accessible to all state departments may be a required part of resolving the 
challenges faced. But this cannot be done through Statistics South Africa alone given 
that they only report of highly aggregated production and sales which would be less 
useful for industrial policy. SARS may be best placed to establishing this central 
database of firm-level data on all sectors. The United Kingdom’s Inter-Departmental 
Business Register (IDBR) presents some lessons and best-practice lessons for the South 
African. The IDBR is a database of United Kingdom (UK) firms from all sectors. This 
database is constructed from firms’ submissions to the HM Revenue & Customs (UK 
SARS equivalent), different departments and regular surveys to support the updating 
of firms’ information81. Essentially South Africa could establish such a database and 
allow all national and provincial government departments and agencies to collect data 
and submit it on this database. This could include more than just the firms’ 
                                              
81 See ONS, n.d. “Introduction to the The Inter-Departmental Business Register”, Office for National Statistics. 
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performance data but also include firms’ track record of all state subsidies and 
incentives received across all departments and agencies. Therefore the state would 
have much more rigorous, nuanced and effective industrial policy.  
 
In addition, changes to the current system of administration would not be advisable 
given that the business process involved are already well entrenched and a new 
administrative system would cause disruption and take time to establish. But it is 
necessary for the state to balance the informational asymmetry. The informational 
asymmetry benefits OEMs by making the threat of relocation credible given the limited 
of industry data and insights within the state. Thus the state has not successfully 
balanced the asymmetric bargaining power through its current initiatives to improve 
internal capacity.  
 
Recommendations 
This study recommends that the state’s challenges can be partly resolved through 
simple institutional changes would allow the state to consolidate its bargaining power 
and use it to coordinate private economic interest in pursuit of national interest. The 
study recommends that the state should: 
1. establish the quantum of support to industry and business; 
2. understand and engage with the political economy aspects of GVCs; and 
3. establish political bargains with multinational lead firms. 
 
The coordination problems of industrial policy can be partly resolved by establishing   
the fundamental condition of shared knowledge, at least to the point that the state 
has full knowledge and access to disaggregated data on the domestic automotive 
sector. 
 
Establish the Quantum of Support to Industry 
Although consolidating and coordinating the administration of industrial policy 
through OEMs is  practical  and  efficient,  this  decision  by  the  state  further  
entrenched  the  unequal  and hierarchical structure that has a high risk of undermining 
industrial policy. Institutional structures and policy then – not the ownership power of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) – has entrenched unequal power relations within 
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the automotive value-chain, which undermines the broader socio-economic goals of 
industrial policy. 
 
Thus it is imperative that the state establish its own central databank of all automotive 
firms’ data with inputs from all state departments and agencies. This will not only assist 
in ensuring  that  industrial  policy  is  nuances  and  more  rigours  to  inter-  and  
intra-sectoral difference, but it will also provide a more substantive base to monitor 
and evaluate industrial policy.  Moreover,  this  would greatly  reduce  the  negative  
political  economy  implications  by reducing the asymmetric bargaining power of 
OEMs which is a crucial mechanism for disciplining foreign capital and multinational 
firms more specifically. 
 
Understand and Engage with the Political Economy Aspects of GVCs 
GVCs remain an elusive challenge for most policy-makers primarily because firms’ 
sourcing and investment decisions in global, and even regional, value-chains have a 
strong political element despite being driven by economic considerations. This often 
requires a fundamental shift in the underlying justification for policy-making and the 
policy-tools used when dealing with industries that are integrated into GVCs. 
 
For example, the move by Johnson Controls (and other automotive textile companies) 
was primarily aimed at exploited lower wage conditions in Lesotho82. This may seem 
like a threat to job-creation in South Africa given a nationalist approach to policy-
making. However, with a regional approach to policy-making South Africa could 
exploit regional advantages and produce sophisticated high-value-added goods 
whilst integrating smaller neighbouring economies’ industries as follower firms. This 
requires an integration of political policy-making like international relations with 
economics which is the focus of industrial policy. Moreover, this requires greater intra- 
and inter-departmental coordination on policy. For example within the dti the 
Southern African Customs Union Directorate in the International Trade and Economic 
Development Division would need to work more closely with the Automotive Sector 
Desk in the Industrial Development: Policy Development Division.  
                                              
82 Interviews with: Manufacturing Circle, 14 August 2014, Johannesburg; NUMSA, 19 November 2014, Johannesburg. Also see 
Cokayne, 2015. “Labour Drives Firm's Relocation”, Independent Online, 11 May 2015. 
69 
 
 
 
GVCs diminish the possible impact of industrial policy and the means for technological 
upgrading of follower firms. Firms upgrade by achieving the ability to supply 
multinational corporations or participating in different value-chain activities with 
higher value-added. Hence, industrial policy benefits to the local industry can be 
maximised by assisting to develop local lead firms or preparing local follower firms to 
supply lead firms both locally and globally. Although the necessary support that 
follower firms need in order to supply lead firm is illusive, some of the insights from 
interviews shows that supplying OEMs is not simply about capability and that political 
aspects such the inter-firm relations are important. This study has revealed that some 
local firms have a preference to supply foreign OEMs due to less cumbersome 
administration and existing inter-firm relations. Hence, simply focusing on economic 
aspects such as price competitiveness will not guarantee OEM-supply. 
 
Therefore, policy-making should be built on a regional or GVCs perspective on industry 
and economic sectors. In addition, the state should find ways to either restructure its 
business processes such that political and economic aspects of trade and industrial 
policy reinforce each other. This also requires the state to consolidate national interest 
with bilateral and multilateral interests within the region. Moreover, the globalisation 
of capital demands that policy-makers take a regional outlook on policy-making which 
requires an acute understanding and engagement with political economy aspects of 
GVCs. 
 
Establish Political Bargains with Multinational Lead Firms 
GVCs and lead firms’ sourcing decisions are the primary obstacle facing industrial 
policy objectives in internationalised sectors. If multinational lead firms do not 
integrate local firms in their value-chains any support offered to multinational lead 
firms (such as OEMs) will not benefit local industry. Hence, dealing with 
internationalised sectors should be treated differently from domestically-located 
industries. 
 
The observation is supported by existing research such as the political economy 
analysis of Burke and Epstein (2001) who argue that the dominance of neoliberal rules 
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of international finance and the asymmetric bargaining power between MNCs, 
governments and labour mean that investment often results in developmentally 
detrimental outcomes that favour MNCs. The dominance of the neoliberal trade 
paradigm in the multilateral rules set by organisations such as the WTO means that 
MNCs engage in foreign direct investment under a rules that disproportionately favour 
MNCs at the expense of governments and labour in the host countries. Furthermore, 
MNCs have an advantage because there are few MNCs actually engaged in foreign 
investment whilst there are many countries competing to attract that investment 
(Burke & Epstein, 2001). Therefore in the current international rules of foreign 
investment and global competition foreign investment leads to outcomes that tend to 
favour MNCs at the expense of labour and governments. 
 
Thus the only way to ensure benefit to local industry is to tie in state support to local 
content requirements. Alternatively the state may choose to make incentives 
conditional on a certain level of local value-addition. This may require the state to 
forfeit some foreign investment which would have been attracted under different 
conditionalities. In addition, the state would have to have extensive monitoring and 
evaluation of economic outcomes in order to avoid market failure or distortion. Hence, 
under current conditions a more plausible would be for the state to strike political 
bargains with multinational lead firms in order to ensure mutual benefit from 
incentives. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
This research had set itself an ambitious task. Having noted that much of the discourse 
lacked an institutional analysis of the political economy of industrial policy, this study 
set out to contribute one such a study on the matter. Three salient issues were 
identified to examine using the institutional framework drawn from the relevant 
literature.  
 
Firstly there is the issue of the choice of OEMs to produce many different makes and 
models locally, which has locked local automotive production in a spiral of low volumes 
and high unit costs of production. Secondly there is the issue of the policy incoherence 
related to the state’s choice to liberalise the automotive industry too extensively and 
prematurely given the global competitiveness of the local industry. Lastly there was 
the issue of the preference for importing components as opposed to investing in local 
component production. Thus the central problems challenging industrial policy were 
institutional and resolved around the issue of failed coordination to influence the 
decision of different stakeholders by the state. 
 
The study then examined these issues and explained them according to the social 
structures, social relations, power and incentives that result from the political economy 
of industrial policy within the automotive sector. The findings were that industrial 
policy has supported export and production growth in spite of the continued 
dependence on imports, and did not support employment, because it was biased 
towards OEMs and did not differentiate between the different categories of 
components according to job-creation potential. The study then explained this 
through institutional framework grounded in the VoC, GVCs and political economy 
literature. 
 
The findings were that the state coordination failure was caused by the fact that the 
state had established CME structures like the MIDC, ASCCI and SEZs. However, within 
these structures the social relations amongst the stakeholders were competitive rather 
than cooperative and collaborative which is required for CME-type social structures. In 
addition to this the state had spent more focus on establishing and supporting LME-
type institutions like the preoccupation with improving competitiveness. The state 
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encouraged rationalisation which meant reducing the marginal cost of production by 
increasing the economies of scale, and increasing exports. Therefore the state was 
encouraging competitive social relations amongst the different stakeholders within the 
automotive sector. As a result, the corporatist approach to interest articulation, which 
the structures are meant to encourage, was replaced by pluralism resulting to the 
competition to establish the definitive voice within the sector.  
 
Even though the structure for industrial policy-making emphasised the need for CME-
type institutions like clustering, shared learning and greater collaboration. The state 
thus established incentives that were inimical to industrial policy objectives through its 
support for LME-type institutions in the form of widespread liberalisation. As a result 
the state was unable to coordinate the various actors and affect their decisions in 
favour of what was needed to create more jobs.  
 
Firms responded by further entrenching their interest. OEMs behaved as lead firms 
within the automotive sector GVCs which meant they were less cared about the 
wellbeing of the domestic industry and more concerned about maximising returns. 
Therefore OEMs integrated with the domestic component industry for the single 
purpose of extracting rents in the form import duty credits from the state as opposed 
to the development of local higher value-added components’ production. Moreover, 
as opposed to establishing common knowledge, share learning and open access to 
information, the result was an informational asymmetry and asymmetry of bargaining 
power in favour of OEMs over local component producers, and OEMs over the state. 
Thus the resulting hierarchy within the automotive sector has OEMs at the helm.  
 
Industrial policy now serves the explicit interest of OEMs giving them the ability to: 
dictate the price of components, determine the profit margins within the first-market 
(OEM-supply) segment of the automotive sector, and direct the development and 
upgrading of local firms which are integrated into the various OEMs’ GVCs as follower 
firms. In addition, the implication of this hierarchical restructuring means that industrial 
policy is at the mercy of multinational OEMs’ decision-making. And the state has 
limited administrative and political capacity to influence the decision of OEMs because 
the state cannot differentiate between the different impacts of various components on 
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employment. Lastly, the state cannot fully discredit credibility of the OEM threat to 
relocate. Thus industrial policy is “captured” in a way.  
 
Hence, due to both the policy measures and the institutional design South Africa’s 
industrial policy has not been oriented towards more labour-absorbing activities, 
especially in the impact on local components manufacturing.  
 
This study therefore builds on the previous body of work to assess the specific impacts 
of the institutional factors. The study has therefore contributes a more nuanced 
understanding of the political economy of industrial policy and the role of the state in 
industrial development. Moreover, as a way of avoiding the common and foregone 
criticism that development economics work inevitably becomes an analysis of policy 
(Adam & Dercon, 2009, p. 179), this study incorporates both policy and institutional 
analysis in attempt to fully understand the political economy of investment in the 
automotive sector.  
 
Beyond contributing an institution study, through doing this, the study has provided a 
far more nuanced account of the power of OEMs that goes beyond the simple 
explanation of this power deriving from the position of OEMs as multinational 
corporations in a neoliberal policy and global context83.  
 
As highlighted in the recommendations in Chapter 4 this has various implications for 
policy-makers. Firstly that state coordination and policy coherence will continue to be 
a challenge without a consistent dataset for all departments to work from in evaluating 
and consolidating state support to industry. This not only undermines the state 
objectives of policy, but also affects the bargaining power of the state in its relations 
with industry. Secondly, policy-makers need to treat internationalised sectors 
differently from domestically-located industries. GVCs require an institutional political 
economy understanding of industries in order to consolidate and coordinate private 
economic interests in pursuit of national interests. Moreover GVCs, in the context of 
globalised capital, require the state to consolidate national interest with bilateral and 
multilateral interests within the region. 
                                              
83 See Burke & Epstein, 2001; Flatters, 2005, p. 13; Barnes & Morris, 2008, pp. 8-9; Barnes, 2013, pp. 12-13. 
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Unless we are aware of the institutional aspects of investment we will continue making 
policy changes with little impact. Because there may be crucial institutional factors 
undermining the gains. 
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